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The military’s defunct Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy has been studied and debated for decades.
Surprisingly, the question of why a legal regime would combine these particular rules for
information flow has received little attention. More surprisingly still, legal scholars have
provided no systemic account of why law might prohibit or mandate asking and telling. While
there is a large literature on disclosure and a fragmented literature on questioning, considering
either part of the information dissemination puzzle in isolation has caused scholars to overlook
key considerations. This Article tackles foundational questions of information policy and legal
design, focusing on instances in which asking and telling are either mandated or prohibited by
legal rules, legal incentives, or social norms.
Although permissive norms for asking and telling seem pervasive in law, the Article shows that
each corner solution exists in the American legal system. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” “Don’t Ask,
Must Tell,” “Must Ask, Must Tell,” and “Must Ask, Don’t Tell” each fill a notable regulatory
space. After cataloguing examples, the Article gives accounts of why law gravitates toward
particular combinations of asking and telling rules in various domains, and offers some
normative evaluation of these strategies. The Article emphasizes that asking and telling norms
sometimes—but only sometimes—are driven by concerns about how people will use the
information obtained. Understanding the connection to use norms, in turn, provides guidance for
a rapidly advancing future in which big data analytics and expanding surveillance will make old
practices of direct question-and-answer less significant, if not obsolete. In any event, the matrix
of rule combinations highlighted here can reveal new pathways for reforming our practices of
asking and telling in life and law.
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INTRODUCTION
Life is filled with rules about what to ask and what to tell. In a given situation, a
particular question might or might not be appropriate, and so too for disclosure of information—
depending on the applicable mix of law, social norms, ethical commitments, and other factors. At
some level, everyone is aware that a mixture of forces influences our decisions to seek
information and to offer it up. But legal scholars have not yet dug into how these rules work and
interact, nor into what their content should be. Rules for disclosure are the subject of
longstanding scholarly attention, of course, covering everything from the duty to warn to the
protection of classified information. 1 But rules for asking questions have received less systematic
study, 2 and the possible combinations of rules for asking and telling seem to lack any systematic
treatment at all.
In this Article, we examine several intriguing combinations of rules for asking and
telling. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) already has drawn repeated scrutiny from legal scholars
because of the now-abandoned policy regarding gay people serving in the military. 3 Other
combinations of asking and telling norms can be equally interesting, however. Below we pay
special attention to extreme combinations beyond DADT, including the trust-based “Don’t Ask,
Must Tell” (DAMT), the ostensibly redundant “Must Ask, Must Tell” (MAMT), and the often
regrettably adversarial “Must Ask, Don’t Tell” (MADT). To our knowledge, no one has
examined these extreme combinations together, yet each occupies a pocket of existing law and
social life.
Many of the lessons that we offer below are localized within particular combinations of
asking and telling rules. These combinations are interesting and important enough on their own,
but we also want to suggest broader lessons. We extend and integrate strands of scholarship in
law and economics as well as law and social norms. 4 The notion that asking and telling norms

1

See infra notes 34-37.
See infra notes 39-43.
3
See, e.g., Michelle Benecke, Turning Points: Challenges and Successes in Ending Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,
18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35 (2011) (discussing the repeal as a triumph of servicemembers); Suzanna Danuta
Walters, The Few, the Proud, the Gays: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and the Trap of Tolerance, 18 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 87 (2011) (raising concerns about continued heteronormativity); Eugene R. Milhizer, “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell”: A Qualified Defense, 21 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 249, 350 (2004) (presenting DADT as a
compromise between people with different normative views on homosexuality); Tobias B. Wolff, Compelled
Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1145
(1998) (arguing that, partly because of an assumption of heteronormativity, DADT effectively “compel[ed] gay
servicemembers falsely to identify themselves as straight”); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 540 (1998)
(“[T]he policy simultaneously dampens the empowering aspects and amplifies the disempowering aspects of gay
invisibility.”). An example of a DADT proposal in a non-military context is Osamu Muramoto, Bioethics of the
Refusal of Blood by Jehovah’s Witnesses, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 463, 466 (1999) (recommending DADT for a religious
organization and its members to protect “autonomous decisions” about blood transfusions).
4
By “social norm” we mean a standard for conduct that might be enforced by non-legal sanction or
incentive, such as shaming or refusal to deal (or commendation or acceptance). Like law’s normative propositions, a
social norm in this sense might or might not be internalized; either way, laws and social norms can influence
behavior. Also, in this Article we do not take a general position on how social norms and laws come about, either as
a matter of design or spontaneous generation. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1 (2001) (providing one rich account of norm development). Knowing the sources of a given rule can
provide insight on the feasibility and methods of changing the rule, and even a reason to believe that the rule is good
2
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are best understood when taken together appeared no later than 1994, in Game Theory and the
Law. 5 But there the focus was on comparing “Don’t Ask, May Tell” with “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.” Moreover, positive and normative evaluations will be incomplete without accounting for
social in addition to legal norms. The real-world set of asking and telling rules changes when
social norms are added to legal norms, and so might one’s evaluation of them. 6 If nothing else,
this Article facilitates integrated thinking on the actual and proper assortment of rules for
acquiring and disclosing information. We hope our matrix of combinations is itself an important
advance, but a good typology also can help reveal policy options that would not be obvious
otherwise. We do some of that work along the way.
Part I of the Article sets out functional definitions for asking and telling, and then offers
the beginnings of positive and normative theories for regulating asking and telling. Part II turns
to concrete situations, emphasizing interesting and counterintuitive combinations of norms. This
part concentrates on fairly simple social interactions between two parties, in which party A might
ask party B for information and B might tell information to A. Part III adds the possibility that A
might ask a third-party C for information about B, where C could be a person or a database. Our
discussion of these “Ask C” situations is even more provisional than the rest of the Article. But
raising the ask-C issue allows us to think about a future in which the social practice of
interpersonal Q&A becomes ever less significant. What legal norms are likely and appropriate
for that future? 7 Part III concludes by pointing to a few situations in which we believe that legal
and social norms for asking and telling are probably suboptimal, and suggests reforms.
In suggesting answers for the future, we will spotlight use rules. Sometimes people’s use
of information is regulated, as distinguished from how people collect information in the first
place. For example, law might prohibit hiring decisions based on certain applicant
characteristics, such as race, whether or not law regulates asking and telling about race. Often
use concerns must be considered to understand asking and telling rules. In other situations,
however, asking and telling rules are justified quite apart from any use rule. One of our goals is
to consider when asking and telling rules are part of a larger regulatory mission involving the use
of information, and when such rules stand on their own. Seeing this difference in justifications
for Q&A rules has important implications for a world of rapidly expanding ask-C options.
Before going forward, caveats are in order. First, our analysis references occasionally
controversial distinctions among may, must, and don’t. 8 Readers will differ on whether, for
or bad. But we will not present a general theory of origin for the rules we study, and we trust that any oscillation
between a design perspective and a spontaneous generation perspective will not seriously undercut our analysis.
5
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 91-93
(1994) (discussed below at text accompanying notes 101-103). A recent article that is sensibly concerned about the
ability of regulated parties to evade don’t-ask norms using, for example, big data is Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling
Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1190
(2011).
6
See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1960-61 (2001). Another insightful
contribution is Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2279-82
(1996). A kind of DADT rule can arise from efficient social norms of privacy, which prevent gathering and
disseminating information more harmful to a gossip target than helpful to the gossipers. McAdams claims that antiblackmail laws might make sense if combined with such privacy norms.
7
Our treatment of database queries is much like surveillance, in which A monitors B without any questions.
In at least some cases, surveillance can be analyzed in the same way as our ask-C situations.
8
Logically, the opposite of “must ask” is “mustn’t ask,” rather than “don’t ask.” But in light of the way we
use the term “don’t” and our focus on essentially free societies, we do not distinguish “mustn’t” from “don’t.” Free
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instance, loss of face or litigation incentives or grant conditions are enough to locate a rule
beyond “may.” 9 We are curious about even modest influences on behavior, regardless, and the
categorization problems are not special to Q&A rules. Our analysis will provide insight wherever
one draws lines around contested concepts such as coercion. In the same spirit, we will not
isolate a specific normative framework to evaluate Q&A combinations. We will offer some
provisional judgments and we will introduce a soft presumption against regulating Q&A. Still,
our analysis is designed for use by people of many different ideological stripes. Our goal is to
open up a fascinating set of social interactions for review, allowing evaluation from a wide range
of normative perspectives. Often this inclusive goal and ordinary caution will prevent conclusive
recommendations. But the upside is relevance to a much larger audience.
Furthermore, we cannot cover every possible Q&A combination. There might be a good
article to be written on “Don’t Ask Twice,” 10 “May Ask Thrice,” 11 and even “Must Ask
Thrice,” 12 but ours will not be it. Nor will we explore variations like “May Lie” or “Must Lie,”
since those have been examined fruitfully elsewhere. 13 We generally presume truthful telling and
non-deceptive silences. 14 As well, many Q&A combinations are highly contextual and embedded
in larger relationship webs. Norms change as people progress from first dates to longstanding
marriages, for instance, or from one-shot interactions to repeat play. 15 Norms also can shift

societies virtually never literally compel individuals to do things, with the primary exception being the status of
institutionalized persons, who are sometimes compelled to eat, sleep, or refrain from travel against their will. See,
e.g., Dan Lamothe, Judge Allows Force-Feeding of Detainee at Guantanamo, WASH. POST., May 24, 2014, at A1.
By contrast, when free citizens refuse to engage in an action, they may be subjected to legal penalties (such as fines
or incarceration) or severe social sanctions, but their willingness to endure these harms typically ensures that they
ultimately can disregard a “must” or a “mustn’t.” See generally Jonathan Jorissen, Note, Katrina’s House: The
Constitutionality of the Forced Removal of Citizens from their Homes in the Wake of Natural Disasters, 5 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 587 (2007) (examining forced evacuations during natural disasters). In the cases we describe herein,
people may confront strong or moderate legal and social pressure if they fail to comply with an obligation, but the
“or else” that follows non-compliance falls short of force-feeding or compelled sedation. Our choice of “must ask”
and “don’t tell” rather than “must ask” and “mustn’t tell” is driven by stylistic, not philosophical, considerations.
9
See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 4285.58(c)(6)(ii) (stating that applications for agricultural-cooperative research grants
should include CVs but, “[u]nless pertinent to the project, it should not include . . . personal data such as birth date,
martial [sic] status, or community activities”). Some people really want agricultural-cooperative research grants.
And some people really “may” exit the regulatory jurisdiction to avoid regulation. See Adam B. Cox and Adam M.
Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for
Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 81-83, 92-97 (2013) (examining viable exit options).
10
When asked about his weight by a reporter, NBA player Darryl Dawkins responded, “It’s more than I
want to tell you. And don’t ask again, because I haven’t hit a reporter in five years.” The Last Word, HOU. CHRON.,
Oct. 3, 1995, at 9.
11
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2 (“Antony: You all did see that on the Lupercal I
thrice presented [Caesar] a kingly crown, Which he did thrice refuse: was this ambition?”).
12
“Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?” See AM. JUR. PL. & PR.
FORMS 25B Witnesses § 155 (2007). The apparent norm is to answer this conjunctive question once, rather than
three times.
13
See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1978); Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and Then of Common Law Categories, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1359
(2007); Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, Valuable Lies (2014) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
14
But cf. infra Part II.E (examining codes of silence and evidentiary privilege assertions).
15
See Talley, supra note 6, at 1958-61 (noting that disclosure laws and social norms may complement each
other in repeat play situations, even with an error-prone judiciary).
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depending on whether the asker or teller moves first. 16 And interactions between A and B might
be governed by one combination, while other norms simultaneously govern interactions between
A and C or B and C. 17 We will take up much of this complexity without exhausting it. For the
time being, we lay a foundation for heavier lifting by focusing on relationships with relatively
simple dynamics. So let’s get started.
I. WORKING CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
A. Asking and Telling
The concepts of asking and telling might seem self-evident. To an extent, they are.
Asking questions is a part of ordinary child development that begins when toddlers realize the
prospects for “social information gathering.” 18 Questions directed at others are inspired by the
simple yet powerful recognition that people are repositories of information. The ability to tell
others what you need or what you know also develops early in life, 19 and might have arisen
earlier in human history. 20 Q&A is literally child’s play. But there are nuances to these ideas, and
we want to be adequately clear about our subjects of interest.
We are interested in a set of information problems in social settings, and thus we
concentrate on certain informational functions of asking and telling. What people ordinarily call
asking and telling have other functions that we want to distinguish. A can ask B about something,
which is our focus here, and A also can ask B to do something (as in a favor) or to agree to
something (as in a contract). 21 The latter two statements are designed to prompt action beyond
information disclosure, and we are interested in them only if they involve a request for
information from someone else. 22 For the same reason, we are not studying rhetorical questions
16
Cf. J. Money, Why Are You Asking About My Salary Again?, MSN MONEY, Nov. 4, 2009 (indicating that
it is socially acceptable for A to ask B about his salary if B asked A first), http://money.msn.com/saving-moneytips/post.aspx?post=00000065-0000-0000-92f4-140000000000.
17
See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 6, at 2280-81 (canvassing gossip norms, which can depend on why and
to whom communications are made).
18
See, e.g., Dare A. Baldwin & Louis J. Moses, The Ontogeny of Social Information Gathering, 67 CHILD
DEVEL. 1915, 1925-27 (1996) (offering some theory on social information gathering, in pre-internet terms); Lois
Bloom, Susan Merkin & Janet Wootten, “Wh”-Questions: Linguistic Factors that Contribute to the Sequence of
Acquisition, 53 CHILD DEVEL. 1084, 1086 (1982) (reporting results of a small-n study indicating that “wh-”
questioning started around age two or three).
19
Cf. Stanka A. Fitneva, Nietzsche H.L. Lam & Kristen A. Dunfield, The Development of Children’s
Information Gathering: To Look or to Ask?, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 533, 534 (2013) (“By age four, children
are able to answer simple yes/no questions . . . [but] the limitations apparent in 4-year-olds’ action selection [in
pursuit of an informational goal] suggest that they may . . . have difficulty selecting between direct experience and
asking others.”).
20
See C.E.M. Struyker Boudier, Toward a History of the Question, in QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONING 9, 1011 (Michael Meyer ed. 1988) (collecting and critiquing suggestions that human beings as a class developed the
ability to make assertions before the ability to pose questions).
21
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act illustrates such distinctions. Covered employers may not
request that employees take a lie detector test, see 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1); cf. id. § 2006 (listing numerous
exemptions), and they may not ask about the results of any lie detector test that employees happen to take, see id. §
2002(2).
22
See Tanya Stivers, An Overview of the Question-Response System in American English Conversation, 42
J. PRAGMATICS 2772, 2776-77 (2010) (distinguishing information requests from questions initiating repair or
clarification, seeking agreement, requesting something, seeking an assessment, and so on). Professors’ classroom
questions inhabit an interesting border area. See Anna-Brita Stenstrom, Questioning in Conversation, in QUESTIONS
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or self-questioning. 23 Telling has similar breadth in ordinary usage that reaches beyond our
study: B can tell A about something, which is our focus here, and B also can tell A to do
something (as in a command to an inferior). Commands surely reveal information about those
who issue them, as do questions and requests of all kinds, but we are interested in such
statements only if they involve the production of information.
Because we are studying functional requests for information and functional disclosures,
we have to look beyond form and pay attention to contextual nuance. Our idea of “telling” and
related terms has to go beyond flat declarations. Questions are themselves telling, in the sense
that statements correctly formulated as questions usually reveal something about the questioner’s
interests or beliefs. Every lawyer knows about phony questions, in which an advocate during voir
dire or a judge during oral argument thinly disguises an innuendo as a formal question. 24 We
should recognize the asking and telling aspects of these statements if our analysis is to be well
grounded. Even a nominal silence can reveal information via an observer’s rational inference. In
a related vein, a nominal question might be understood by listeners partly as a command,
depending on the parties’ perceived roles. 25 We are on the lookout for such intermingled
functions in order to understand such social interaction and the applicable norms of good
behavior. In the same spirit, we cannot restrict our idea of “asking” and related terms to
statements with an interrogative syntax. It does not matter for our purposes whether a statement
that effectively requests information ends with a question mark, a rising tone, or any other
conventional marker for a question. “I am interested in learning about subject X” is an
informational question under our functional definition. 26
A functional perspective like ours can make categorization difficult, of course. Rhode
Island v. Innis 27 is a famous illustration. In police custody, “interrogation” is supposed to stop if
the detainee clearly asks for a lawyer’s help. 28 Innis was arrested for armed robbery and he asked
AND QUESTIONING 305, 312 (Michael Meyer ed. 1988) (“Qs in the classroom are pseudo-Qs in that they are not
primarily intended to elicit new information, their main purpose being to check the pupils’ knowledge.”). If you are
a professor, think about what workshop questions are.
23
Cf. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227,
266 (2002) (“The questions I ask are the fundamental tool by which I discover what I do not know.”).
24
See, e.g., Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 495-96, 500-01 (7th Cir. 2007) (involving a factual assertion
embedded in a prosecutor’s question); Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 411-12 (Ind. 1973) (granting a mistrial
for voir dire questions and condemning “interrogat[ion] not with a view towards culling prospective jurors because
of bias or prejudice but to the end that bias and prejudice may be utilized to advantage and prospective jurors
cultivated and conditioned, both consciously and subconsciously”).
25
See Esther N. Goody, Towards a Theory of Questions, in QUESTIONS AND POLITENESS 17, 39 (Esther N.
Goody ed. 1978) (considering “the conditions under which real, that is, genuine, pure information questions are
possible”). The line between request and command has been addressed in Fourth Amendment seizure cases, for
instance. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“[L]aw enforcement officers . . . may pose
questions . . . provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.”) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434-35 (1991)).
26
Cf. John Heritage, The Limits of Questioning: Negative Interrogatives and Hostile Question Content, 34
J. PRAGMATICS 1427, 1427-28 (2002) (offering a simplistic definition of “question” as “a form of social action,
designed to seek information and accomplished in a turn at talk by means of interrogative syntax” and then
highlighting exceptions to the syntax requirement).
27
446 U.S. 291 (1980).
28
See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
That is, if the police want to preserve the suspect’s statements as evidence against the suspect at trial.
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for a lawyer. On the ride to the station, two noticeably chatty officers discussed how there was a
school for disabled children nearby and that a missing shotgun might end up hurting one of
them—at which point Innis asked the officers to turn the car around so that he could show them
where the gun was. 29 The Court majority was willing to define interrogation broadly enough to
include both “express questioning” and its “functional equivalent” based on a reasonable
likelihood of a response, 30 but the Court was not willing to classify the officers’ speech as
interrogation via appeal to conscience. 31 Two of the dissenters basically agreed with the
majority’s test but were “utterly at a loss” to understand the majority’s conclusion. 32 Analogous
disputes pop up on the boundary of telling and revealing by other means. Judges dealing with
Fifth Amendment claims try to decide whether someone was compelled to be a “witness” via
testimonial communication of fact or opinion, or instead revealed incriminating information via
some other method such as an involuntary blood draw or compliance with economic
regulation. 33 This distinction is not always easy to see or understand.
The importance of categorizing such behavior increased once legal consequences
attached. Judicial efforts to regulate police questioning or self-incrimination required definitions
of things like “interrogation” and “witness,” and disputes over the boundaries of those ideas were
sure to follow. Conceptual work will not resolve disputes like Innis, however, which depend on
normative goals. And whether or not the Court got things right in Innis, there certainly will be
borderline cases. Residual vagueness surrounds the ideas of asking and telling, which are
subjects of ongoing study by linguists, anthropologists, sociologists, and others. But wherever
one comes down on borderline cases, there are more than enough consensus cases of asking and
telling to investigate different combinations of norms.
B. General Theories
1. Why Q&A?
When it comes to telling, a tall stack of scholarship offers assistance. Academics have
worked on mechanisms and normative theories for information disclosure for many years. We
already know that information is a valuable resource and public good that “wants to be free” in
some sense, 34 and that, nonetheless, useful information flows may require encouragement. Often
enough A and B are in a situation of asymmetric information regarding a physical or financial
risk to A, for instance. From the perspective of economic efficiency, we can hope or recommend
that any duty to disclose what B knows about the risk to A will draw from a sense of how cheaply
each person can prevent a legally recognized harm along with the effects on ex ante incentives to
obtain such information in the first place. 35 Factors like these are familiar in analyzing tort and
29

Innis, 446 U.S. at 294-95.
Id. at 300-01; see id. at 301.
31
See id. at 302-03.
32
Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 311-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (offering a different
functional test).
33
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000).
34
STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB 202 (1989).
35
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060-61 (1972) (describing a cheapest-cost-avoider approach to tort liability); Kronman, supra note 13, at 2
(distinguishing between information casually acquired and deliberately discovered with reference to investigation
incentives). For a famous case, see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
30
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contract law. On the flipside, legal scholars understand that B often should keep secrets from A to
support contractual, agency, and trust relationships with third parties. 36 Alternatively, a
disclosure by B may enable A to make a decision based on legally forbidden grounds, and so law
might restrict such information flows to prop up anti-use rules. 37
Of course our goal here is not to resolve when disclosure is better than privacy, but the
disclosure literature suggests a challenge for those interested in questions: One might wonder
whether getting society’s telling rules right kills the significance of asking rules. If a legal and
social system can accurately identify when B must, may, and must not disclose information to A,
perhaps developing asking norms for A is superfluous. Moreover, as we will emphasize,
questions themselves are almost invariably telling. Perhaps questions can be re-described as a
kind of disclosure without need for a separate category. And existing theory on asking is indeed
more limited, especially in relation to telling norms.
Yet questions do hold a special place in social interaction—special enough to ground
ongoing conceptual, theoretical, and empirical work across several disciplines. Social scientists
have offered conceptions of questions to distinguish information requests from other statements,
for example. 38 Scholars also have studied how often people ask different types of questions and
how people tend to respond to differently formulated questions, 39 partly to understand norms of
politeness. 40 Survey researchers, for instance, have developed strategies for getting reliable
answers to “sensitive questions.” 41 Much of this research is foundational descriptive work
without offering positive or normative lessons that are conclusive. Thus anthropologist Esther
Goody helped unsettle the partition between asking and ordering. She found that people may
have difficulty asking those in a different social status purely information-seeking questions,
given the audience’s tendency to perceive questions as bundled with either a command or an
inappropriate challenge to their status. 42 Such findings suggest that designing effective norms for
asking and telling can be tricky, whether or not Goody’s ethnographic study generalizes
perfectly. 43

36

See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 699-70 (1980) (discussing trade secrets and incentives to invest in innovation); 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5472 (1st ed. 1986) (collecting historical justifications for
attorney-client privilege, including encouragement of candid client disclosure). For a famous case, see United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (supporting a qualified privilege based on ex ante incentives to deliver candid
advice to the President).
37
See infra Part II.B.2.
38
See supra notes 18-23
39
See, e.g., Heritage, supra note 26, at 1433-44 (studying news interviews for different reactions to
negative framing at the beginning compared to the end of interviewer statements).
40
See, e.g., Penelope Brown & Stephen Levinson, Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena,
in QUESTIONS AND POLITENESS, supra note 25, at 56, 60.
41
See, e.g., Kent H. Marquis et al., Response Bias and Reliability in Sensitive Topic Surveys, 81 J. AM.
STATISTICAL ASS’N 381, 386-87 (1986) (attempting to measure the magnitude and character of the self-reporting
problem).
42
See Goody, supra note 25, at 38-39 (stressing that questions “carry messages about relationships”); see
also Karen L. Pliskin, Verbal Intercourse and Sexual Communication: Impediments to STD Prevention, 11 MED.
ANTHROP. Q. 89, 92, 99 (1991).
43
See Goody, supra note 25, at 20 (presenting her study of a Ghanaian community as a beginning for
understanding connections between asking and commanding).
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Even these modest beginnings are enough to indicate distinctive functions for
informational questions. A question is a special device for information collection, an interactive
call for information that alerts an audience to the collection effort and that usually reveals
something about the questioner, 44 but in a special sense and with a special function. Questions
reveal somebody’s interest in and comfort with additional information on a given topic, unlike
concealed surveillance and other non-interactive research. And these revelations tend to increase
the probability of a responsive disclosure without guaranteeing an answer. 45 Questions alert
audiences to curiosities that might otherwise be ignored, which enables audiences to provide
thoughtful answers or silence, and to avoid wasteful guessing about the interests or comfort level
of other people. All of this is fairly obvious but still important. Merely permitting disclosure is an
awfully hit-or-miss way to achieve informed, targeted, and voluntary communicative exchanges.
Furthermore, social and legal systems cannot, in fact, accurately identify all and only the true
informational interests of a diverse population across all circumstances. People writing
mandatory disclosure rules for prescribed conditions cannot possibly foresee every instance in
which information should be exchanged, even if those rules were perfectly enforced.
Try imagining a world without people asking each other questions and therefore without
answers to questions. This is a nightmare scenario, is it not? People would not be entirely silent,
but the lack of social interaction through Q&A would be terrible. All too often the social system
would misfire, with people dumping unwanted information on others and failing to provide
wanted information that they would be happy to give. Adding questions to our social practices
can facilitate individually and socially enriching information exchanges in a world—our world—
where everybody knows something and nobody knows everything.
2. Q&A Unbound
At this early stage and bracketing the disclosure rules referenced above, 46 a normative
presumption in favor of individual choice in asking and telling might be attractive. This is
consistent with what some people do when they contemplate the voluntary exchange of goods
and services. The same presumption might apply when we evaluate the rules for information
exchanges in the form of questions showing curiosity and answers meant to satisfy those
curiosities. If so, “May Ask, May Tell” is the best default combination of norms. In general, each
of us would have the choice to express our interests in information and to decide whether to
fulfill the information requests of others, without the threat of legal or social penalty.
Sometimes societal indifference to Q&A choices can be attributed to very low stakes.
The state really does not care whether individuals eat with forks or chopsticks in East Asian
restaurants; waiters may ask patrons which they prefer but need not, while customers may tell
waiters about their preferences but need not. In other examples, the stakes are higher but the
magnitude and the direction of the tradeoffs are uncertain, at least to outsiders. Employment
reference checks in the private sector are generally May Ask, May Tell. If restaurateurs are eager
to learn how a wait-staff applicant performed in a prior job, they may call the previous employer,
who may be forthcoming or reticent. Balancing the costs and benefits of such reference checks is
quite context-sensitive, implicating thorny issues of employee mobility, employment
44

A question that someone literally must ask does not reveal much about that person, although the actual
message received by the audience depends on what they (think they) know.
45
On reasons for increased responsiveness, see text accompanying note 92, below.
46
See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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discrimination, wage pressure, and potentially even competition law. Private ordering might be
the best we can do. Law’s role could be restricted to enforcing voluntary agreements to disclose
information and keep secrets. 47
Often law does look this libertarian, well beyond the famously formal right to remain
silent during police interrogations. 48 Indeed a potentially large number of laws restricting asking
and telling would draw serious constitutional objections. A legal command to stifle particular
honest questions 49 or to stem the flow of truthful information 50 looks much like the kind of
content-based regulation that judges condemn. 51 So, too, for commanding that people disclose
some category of information 52 or that people ask some category of questions. 53
True, free speech doctrine is a work in progress and there are strong counter-currents in
existing doctrine. For instance, judges shy away from using speech doctrine against contracts. 54
Indeed whole categories of challenges get only modest traction with judges, including public
employee claims 55 and business resistance to the disclosure of facts to consumers. 56 In addition,
nobody really thinks to raise free speech objections within entire fields of law, such as tort law’s
duties to warn. 57 We will not examine the First Amendment issues in detail. But it is worth
47
In closely related contexts like criminal history checks for job applicants, jurisdictions sometimes codify
their beliefs that some lines of questioning are off limits. See infra notes 218-220 and sources cited therein
(discussing the dynamics arriving from “ban the box” initiatives).
48
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). There are complications for a libertarian story in this
setting, aside from subtle pressures on relatively unsophisticated arrestees. Miranda warnings require law
enforcement to inform arrestees of their right to remain silent, see id., so that segment of the interaction is “May
Ask, Must Tell” (about suspect rights). Furthermore, many police jobs come with an implicit if not formal or
judicially enforced duty to investigate crime, cf. Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.
2003) (indicating “a further duty to investigate” before making a probable-cause arrest if “the complaint would lead
a reasonable officer to be suspicious”); Pete’s Towing Co. v. City of Tampa, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla.
2009) (defending police officers against a harassment suit by reference to their duty to investigate), so interrogation
itself can be characterized as “Must Ask, May Tell.”
49
Cf. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (mentioning “[t]he right of
citizens to inquire”).
50
See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85, 94 (1977).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Information Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057-58 (2000) (criticizing information privacy duties beyond
contract); cf. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650 (2009) (studying
possible free speech objections to legal duties of confidentiality).
52
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995) (involving the identity of a
political leafleteer); cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984) (holding that governmentrequired disclosure of trade secrets may constitute a taking).
53
To our knowledge, must-ask rules have not been subject to free speech litigation.
54
See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 670-71 (1991) (relying on a generally applicable legal duty to
keep promises or pay up).
55
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
56
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651-53 (1985); American Meat Inst. v.
Dep’t of Agr., 770 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying Zauderer beyond anti-deception efforts to country-of-origin
labeling). But cf. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (condemning
graphic cigarette warnings).
57
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xii (1993); Robert Post,
Understanding the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 549, 552 (2012) (claiming that “the rule against content
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suggesting that constitutional problems might reinforce other normative doubts about departing
from May Ask, May Tell. If nothing else, constitutional questions can inhibit the creation of
legal norms for asking and telling, such that social norms—including political correctness,
patriotism, and politeness—would become the only available mechanism for social control.
May Ask, May Tell might feel equally familiar in our ordinary social lives. A sense of
free inquiry and open response is especially familiar to academics like us, who spend a good part
of our working lives formulating questions for ourselves and others to answer. But it is easy to
overstate people’s freedom to ask and tell without social or emotional penalty. Many people are
told or instinctively follow a general rule against talking to strangers, outside of defined scripts.
Most people have a very limited face-to-face communication of any kind with strangers and even
acquaintances. 58 (Sidewalk preachers aside.) “How are you?” is not actually an attempt to collect
information most of the time, nor is “Fine, thanks” expected to be an informative answer. Such
polite interactions are safe harbors for interpersonal situations, allowing people to display
sociability in an unthreatening way. That said, people do constantly engage in Q&A with
acquaintances without much sense of obligation one way or the other, within a number of topics.
Generalizations are a bit hazardous here. But probably the closer the personal relationship, and
the more impersonal the form of communication, the greater the freedom for individual choice
over Q&A without social penalty.
As a rule of thumb, then, our law tends toward May Ask, May Tell, while our social
norms often push toward more inhibited combinations. This impression renders it worth
considering the reasons why social groups and, at least occasionally, legal institutions might
depart from May Ask, May Tell. A complete response would require a full account of ethical,
social, and legal norms governing all questions and answers, along with convincing positive and
normative theories for the prevailing rules, which cannot be done in an article. Instead we offer
illustrative social and legal norms in particular settings. And we suggest clusters of plausible
justifications for such regulatory norms, even if we cannot fully explain their development. For
building blocks, we take up asking and telling norms separately.
3. Regulating Telling
Social norms for telling often are clear. If asked and if you know, you are more or less
obligated, as a member of the community in good standing, to tell the time of day. For free. True,
you won’t be run out of town if you object to others free riding on your investment in
discovering the time of day, or if you plead with people to consider the ex ante incentive effects
for everyone concerned if you cough up the information without payment. And you might evade
social penalties by feigning ignorance with a quick, “Sorry.” But you should feel badly about

discrimination is applied in only limited circumstances”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content
Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23-28; see also Helen Norton,
You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 728-29 (2003) (defending regulation of employer questions to protect don’t-use norms).
58
See Elizabeth Dunn & Michael Norton, Hello, Stranger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2014, at 6 (Sunday
Review) (op-ed). There is local variation in practices. See Peter J. Rentfrow, Introduction, in GEOGRAPHICAL
PSYCHOLOGY: EXPLORING THE INTERACTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR 3 (Peter J. Rentfrow ed. 2014)
(“[A]slight nod and smile to a stranger is an acceptable greeting in Austin, Texas, but such behavior would be
considered an affront in New York City and possibly perverted in London.”).
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that response. 59 Similar observations apply to a social norm in favor of warning people who you
know are in the dark, even strangers, about known risks of physical harm. “Watch out” is
basically a free service. On the flipside, people operate under a general rule against reporting bad
news. If you don’t have anything positive to say, don’t say anything at all—unless you’re a
reporter. 60 A softer norm is to avoid distracting or unsettling people with “too much
information,” whether personal or not.
We also live with nuances and complexities in telling norms. On the one hand, generally
people are supposed to keep their friends’ secrets, to build and maintain trust. On the other hand,
there is a general norm in favor of reporting crimes to authorities who can respond effectively
(and without blood feuds). So secret-keeping norms and crime-reporting norms may clash.
Dramatic examples include codes of silence within subcommunities of certain police
departments. 61 Consider also social norms against gossip, 62 and countervailing norms that tend to
encourage it. 63 Passing on supposedly true tidbits about people’s so-called private lives is
condemned by many, vocally, as degrading the gossipers and perhaps the subject of the gossip,
while distracting the listening public from weightier matters. 64 Yet gossip is a kind of currency,
too, which can show that the gossiper is “in the know” and therefore a valuable social node.
Finally, gossip is widely understood to be a low-cost tool for maintaining social control; the fear
of becoming the target for negative gossip prompts individuals in close-knit communities to
adhere to social norms. 65 With these complexities, gossip is a somewhat constrained and yet
vibrant practice in our society.
We are now touching on legal norms, given that garden-variety tort law includes various
duties to warn relative strangers 66 and other positive law may require people to report suspected

59

Note that many must-tell norms are conditional on being asked. There is no norm in favor of repeatedly
calling out the time of day without being asked. Again, asking a question informs listeners of the questioner’s
interests and may avoid wasteful guessing and information overloads. Compare junk mail.
60
Cf. Adam Waytz et al., The Lesser Minds Problem, in ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING HUMANNESS AND
DEHUMANIZATION 49, 53 (Paul G. Bain et al. eds. 2013) (explaining that studies indicate “the tendency for people to
keep negative emotions hidden or private,” and a resulting underestimation by observers of the amount of negative
emotion experienced by friends and peers).
61
See, e.g, John Kleinig, The Blue Wall of Silence: An Ethical Analysis, 15 INT’L J. APP. PHIL. 1, 4-7 (2001)
(offering a nuanced account of such codes as an outgrowth of associational bonding and loyalty); Neal Trautman,
Truth About the Code of Silence Revealed, 49 LAW & ORDER 68 (2001) (reporting results of an officer survey); infra
Part II.E.1.
62
See McAdams, supra note 6, at 2280-81 (presenting many examples of don’t-ask and don’t-tell antigossip social norms and their context sensitivity).
63
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 57 (1991) (“[P]eople in [Shasta County, California’s]
Oak Run area ‘gossip all the time’”).
64
See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890); Nicole Winefield, Pope in Blistering Critique of Vatican Bureaucrats: Christmas Message Rebukes
“Hypocritical” Cardinals, Bishops, and Urges Them to be Joyful, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 23, 2014, at A1
(quoting Pope Francis’s remarks referencing the “terrorism of gossip” that can “kill our colleagues and brothers in
cold blood”).
65
See ELLICKSON, supra note 63, at 213-15.
66
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341 & 345 (1965) (involving land possessor liability for
dangers unknown to those with a privilege to enter); id. § 388 (involving chattel dangers known to the supplier).
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crimes to government officials. 67 Another well-known example is that agency officials are
obligated to hand over certain government records to those who ask for them under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). 68 These are “Must Tell” laws. On the flipside, a famous “Don’t Tell”
legal norm comes from the system of classified information. 69 A Top Secret stamp indicates that
a government official must keep the information within a circle of people sharing similar security
clearances, 70 which is a bit like keeping a friend’s confidences. A favorite don’t-tell example for
lawyers also involves a principal-agent relationship. Attorneys are usually duty-bound to
maintain client confidences, unless the client decides to waive the privilege. 71
Thus law and social norms both encourage and discourage disclosure. As for
explanations and justifications, we have alluded to standard theory on risky information
asymmetries, third-party interests, and incentive effects in choosing between disclosure and
privacy. 72 These considerations may point in different directions in different settings, which
makes for some debatable policy choices but also helps structure inquiry into telling norms.
“Don’t Tell” often reinforces information asymmetries to protect third parties and to
generate incentives that support valued relationships. Whether the situation is a friend holding
another friend’s confidence or an official holding a state secret, more than one person’s interests
are implicated. Law and society might choose sides by requiring secrecy until all those with
access to the information consent to further disclosure. Moreover, law’s support for don’t tell
may increase the chances of disclosure in the first place, thereby promoting socially beneficial
trust relationships. 73 Of course privacy can promote criminal conspiracies and corrupt
governments, too, but the double-edged nature of many privacy norms is a reason for careful
attention to context. Additionally, a don’t-tell norm might be sensible even if one particular
disclosure has no immediate negative effect. With unraveling, one person’s revelation of
information may prompt observers to make rational inferences about everyone who tries to
remain silent, and in this sense interfere with their choices to reveal or conceal. 74 The felt threat
of unraveling may be related to a don’t-use norm. If a particular ground for decision is forbidden,
forbidding disclosure of information may prevent such decisions.
67
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 1-2 (2014) (reporting that all fifty states require some class of persons to report suspected child abuse to
an agency, and that about eighteen states extend this duty to all persons); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B
(involving a limitation on psychotherapist-patient privilege for a “threat of imminently dangerous activity by the
patient”); cf. Mark Osiel, Rights to Do Grave Wrongs, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 107, 166-67 (2013) (expressing worry
about disincentives to seek care when caregivers are legally obligated to report suspected wrongdoing or illness);
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist., 542 U.S. 177, 187-91 (2004) (upholding a state law requiring people to identify
themselves upon request by police officers, as applied to a proper investigative stop involving no apparent risk of
compelled self-incrimination).
68
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
69
See Exec. Order No. 13,292 (2003); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 937-40 (2006).
70
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793.
71
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
72
See supra Part I.B.1.
73
See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary
privilege on the ground that “the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential
relationship necessary for successful treatment”).
74
See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-93; Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
723 (1999).
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“Must Tell” norms generally attack information asymmetries to protect the interests of
those outside the loop, sometimes despite problematic incentives. Consider duties to warn
strangers. 75 Such burdens of disclosure might lack grounding in interpersonal agreements or trust
relationships, but other justifications enter the picture. At least with a cheapest-cost-avoider idea
in play, 76 there are circumstances in which a quick warning from people who happen to have
knowledge will prevent bad outcomes for others, without overloading them with information or
intolerably weakening the incentives for discovering hazards. Miranda warnings might fit here,
as well; the hope is that they help suspects make informed judgments, 77 at little cost to police
officers who ought to know about these rights anyway. Even social norms in favor of telling the
time when asked have a similar defense. Agency relationships may point toward disclosure, as
well, albeit to principals. Agents have and should have various duties to inform their principals,
such as when lawyers conduct internal investigations for corporate clients 78 or government
officials respond to FOIA requests. 79
4. Regulating Asking
On the asking side, many social norms are highly contextual but nonetheless common
knowledge. 80 Asking how much money someone makes is usually bad form in the U.S., maybe
because neither employees nor their employers want to be shown up, except perhaps on Wall
Street. 81 In contrast, socially adept adults are more or less required to ask toddlers questions
when interacting with caregiving parents, a popular one being “How old are you?” But at some
point it becomes inappropriate to ask a woman her age, 82 and perhaps a softer rule applies to men
as well. On the other hand, the social norm in favor of asking seems to reappear with respect to
anyone who appears to be impressively old. 83 For disabilities, the social norm is against asking a
75

Most jurisdictions are reluctant to impose legal duties in these situations, see, e.g., Harper v. Herman,
499 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Minn. 1993), though many people feel morally obliged to render assistance and some
jurisdictions have created legal duties to rescue a stranger if the act of rescue exposes the rescuer to no risk of harm.
See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help
Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 5-15, 22-30 (1993).
76
See supra note 35.
77
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2004) (plurality) (referring to informed choice as an
objective of Miranda).
78
See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Roberts, 254 F.R.D. 371, 382 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see generally Veronica Root, The
Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 537-38 (2014) (discussing internal and external
investigations).
79
See supra note 68.
80
See, for example, clickbait stories like Jackie Pilossoph, 10 Questions You Should Never Ask Someone
You’ve Been Dating for Less than a Year, Huffington Post.Com, Nov. 16, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jackie-pilossoph/10-questions-you-should-n_b_4281387.html; or Kathryn Tuggle,
10 Questions to You Must Never Ask Your Boss, THE STREET.COM, Nov. 20, 2013,
http://www.thestreet.com/story/12114525/1/10-questions-you-must-never-ask-your-boss.html.
81
For suggestions that this norm is fading among social-media saturated Millennials, see Jen Doll, Could
Millennials End Salary Secrecy?, THE WIRE, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.thewire.com/business/2013/04/couldmillennials-end-salary-secrecy/64317/.
82
See, e.g., Susan Sontag, The Double-Standard of Aging, in ON THE CONTRARY: ESSAYS BY MEN AND
WOMEN 99, 99-100 (Martha Rainbolt & Janet Fleetwood eds., 1984) (excepting bureaucrats from the “taboo” and
proceeding to critique societal ideals for women that help produce discomfort over such questions).
83
On television, birthdays of children and exceptionally elderly people are celebrated, but there is no public
party for reaching the stage of just plain old.

– 15 –

January 16, 2015 Draft

person about their apparent mental or physical impairments, not to mention any question that
sounds like, “What’s wrong with you?” Such questions, especially from strangers, can trigger
feelings of insult or intrusion, even though questions about disability are not always
unwelcome. 84 In fact, “Do you need help?” sometimes is socially mandatory. Interestingly, when
we move from disability to what people consider injury, must-ask norms can appear again—
although there might be a risk of unwelcome invasiveness. 85 An example is the friendly question,
“How did you break your leg?” 86 In a related vein, we have had the off-putting experience of
dining with people who fail to ask us a single question during the meal, and it was hard not to
infer narcissism. Depending on the context, then, either asking or not asking can give rise to
offense and some kind of social penalty.
Law incorporates various norms for asking questions, too, although not the exact same
norms. “Don’t Ask” shows up most famously when police officers must stop questioning
suspects in custody after they ask for a lawyer, at least if the officers care about admissibility of
suspect statements. 87 Other examples arise from anti-discrimination law in the employment
context, although there are fewer formal don’t-ask provisions than you might think. 88 “Must
Ask” laws are easiest to find in restricted markets, where only some people are entitled to buy.
Sellers of alcohol, tobacco, guns, and prescription drugs are sometimes legally obliged to check
buyers’ ages or other characteristics. 89 Additional must-ask duties emerge from contractual and
principal-agent relationships. Federal government employees with long-term access to federal
facilities must answer a series of questions as part of a background check—and so some current
government employee is obligated to ask these questions. 90 Indeed, any agency with an
investigative mission includes a must-ask norm for its employees, from Census Bureau

84

See, e.g., http://storycorps.org/listen/anthony-and-jessica-villarreal/ (recounting experiences of an
Afghanistan veteran and burn victim, who thought, “Man, people don’t know how to ask questions. They just want
to stare and point.”).
85
See LESLIE JAMISON, THE EMPATHY EXAMS 3 (2014) (flagging the difficulty of properly showing
empathy without becoming unduly invasive).
86
Along with “How are you?,” this question is used to illustrate a lawful inquiry under the ADA in EEOC
Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examination of Employees Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act (July 27, 2000), reprinted in 2 CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS appdx. F16 (Feb. 2014 database update).
87
See supra note 28.
88
See infra Part II.A.2. There are analogous restraints on asking in private associations. See infra Part
II.B.1 (discussing religious confession). After a round of publicity about scouts asking prospective players questions
designed to reveal sexual orientation, the NFL adopted a code with the following language:
Coaches, General Managers and others responsible for interviewing and hiring draft-eligible
players and free agents must not seek information concerning or make personnel decisions based
on a player’s sexual orientation. This includes asking questions during an interview that suggest
that the player’s sexual orientation will be a factor in the decision to draft or sign him. Examples:
Do you like women or men? How well do you do with the ladies? Do you have a girlfriend?
Nat’l Football League, Excellence in Workplace Conduct: Sexual Orientation 1 (2014).
89
See infra note 173.
90
See National Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 752-53 (2011) (discussed in Part
II.D.1 below).
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canvassers to beat cops. 91 A variety of private sector employees have contractual or other legal
obligations to ask questions on behalf of others, including lawyers hired by clients.
Positive and normative theory is not well-established for such asking norms. Asking
norms are undoubtedly connected to goals of discouraging or encouraging information flows, as
are telling norms, but more is at stake. A good starting point is to wonder why questions from A
would increase the probability of responsive disclosures by B. Questions reveal someone’s
interest in and comfort with more information on a given topic, but someone else must decide to
respond. Several familiar explanations present themselves: (1) B might answer A out of
generosity or altruism, perhaps acting as a good citizen by responding to the identified
informational need of another person. Generous community-building behavior, including telling
time or giving directions, implicates the virtues of voluntary interaction. (2) B might answer A as
part of a bargain that society supports, offering information valued by A in exchange for
something valued by B. Answering questions can build credit with the other party, discharge
debts, or otherwise fulfill existing contractual or agency duties that are socially desirable. (3) Or
B might answer A because of unwelcome pressure that society condemns, often labelled
coercion. These scenarios need not fit any attractive model of voluntary interaction, even
acknowledging that the boundaries of coercion are contested. 92
Thus one simple reason for “Don’t Ask” is to prevent unwelcome pressure. Following
scholarship like Goody’s and cases like Innis, we know that questions can feel like commands to
disclose. Police interrogation and certain employer-employee relations fit here. Equally
important, pressured disclosures pose more than one risk. The loss might be to B’s autonomy
alone, but also could involve the accuracy and reliability of the information received by A
(consider torture-induced confessions). Furthermore, we might worry about how A will use the
information even if B’s response is perfectly accurate. Don’t-ask norms can be part of larger
efforts to bolster don’t-use norms, 93 with coercive questioning being one method of fueling
decisions on prohibited grounds. Employment discrimination law is a plausible example here,
too (while police interrogation is not). A related concern about involuntary disclosure returns us
to unraveling, which is part of the don’t-tell story. 94 Once questioning draws attention to a topic,
rational inference may prevent anyone from effectively remaining silent, thereby revealing
information on which we would rather not have decisions made.
Worrisome questions occur even when no one is browbeaten, however, and often to
promote secrecy. Don’t-use norms reemerge here. A simple question may increase the
probability of voluntary disclosure by those who want to take advantage of the questioner’s
interests. A prospective employee gaining favor by accurately answering an employer’s question
about family status or religion, for instance, will not dissipate other people’s objections to
employers making hiring decisions on those grounds. If these questions can be limited, B might
not know enough to cater to A’s interests. 95 In this respect don’t-ask norms functions like don’t91

See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 556 U.S. 452, 507-08 (2002) (describing compulsory and non-permissible
questioning of citizens by census takers).
92
Finally, B might be under pressure from a regulatory legal or social norm, which we are attempting to
explain here. For a note on coercion’s boundaries, see supra note 8.
93
See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-92.
94
See supra note 74.
95
Cf. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 93 (suggesting that don’t-ask laws for employers are pointless if
applicants know the employer’s preferences and may tell).
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tell norms, where an attempt is made to prevent a class of people from revealing their interests.
And this helps justify prohibitions on employers asking questions about certain employee
characteristics. 96 Perhaps the archaic social norm against asking an adult woman her age is best
defended along these lines, as reinforcement for a don’t-use norm, if not relief from incentives to
prevaricate.
Don’t-ask norms do more than support anti-coercion goals and don’t-use norms, though.
Friendly questions and equally friendly responses can jeopardize trust relationships, even where
use of the information is unobjectionable. B may have an ongoing contractual, agency, or other
trust relationship with a third-party that would be violated by disclosure to A. Perhaps questions
increase the chances of a breach, and therefore reduce ex ante incentives to create these trust
relationships. Another concern unrelated to use is that questions can injure the questioner. A’s
questions can reveal interests, beliefs, or ignorance in ways that insult or offend B, or that an
audience might take advantage of. Deterring questions about disability might be built on
assumptions (accurate or not) that the targets of such queries are vulnerable if the topic is
opened. Injury could be distinguished as a presumably temporary condition that people usually
are strong enough to discuss. Similarly, to the extent a question suggests a problematic norm, we
might be better off without this tell. Social norms can be socially harmful, and freedom to
question might reinforce a perception, perhaps inaccurate, that a harmful norm prevails. Certain
workplace don’t-ask norms (religion, family status, sexual orientation, and so on) can be partly
defended if not explained by these thoughts.
“Must Ask” norms might seem more difficult to understand, except as friendly reminders
to inform oneself or to show interest in other people. 97 Asking little kids their age falls within
these parameters. In law, leading examples again suggest support for use norms—this time mustuse norms that indicate secrets must be exposed to protect other people. Consider restricted
markets, in which the government wants commercial transactions limited but not eliminated.
Alcohol sellers might want to sell to anybody with cash (no questions asked, as the saying goes),
but law is supposed to make them alert to purchaser traits and use that information to
discriminate. 98 Third-party protection explanations are likewise plausible in contractual and
agency relationships. These relationships can yield a legal duty to serve a principal by posing
questions to someone else. Good detectives and diligent census takers return to mind. In
addition, a legal duty to investigate may be triggered even if the beneficiaries are not easily
classified as principals. One example involves Social Security proceedings conducted by
Administrative Law Judges, who have an obligation to investigate the facts and administer the
96

See infra Part II.A.2 (collecting prohibited and disfavored questions). Some employers might want law to
assure employees that employment decisions will not be based on certain grounds, such as race or religion, and
welcome the command or incentive to avoid asking questions about those characteristics.
97
Sometimes people need encouragement to ask questions when they are too afraid of suggesting their
ignorance to others, such as in lecture halls, faculty workshops, and job interviews. But this reason for a must-asksomething rule seems less likely to appear in law.
98
A must-ask norm could be designed to prevent telling revelations about questioner interests. If everyone
knows that a group is compelled to ask a question, then asking will not reveal the questioners’ independent interests.
Perhaps this is a plausible part of the compromise in some restricted product markets, such as firearms, where
government-mandated questions might protect the most conscientious sellers from standing out to their most
libertarian customers. Another version of the idea involves perceptions of suspicion. Mandatory TSA screening
questions at airports, which we discuss in Part III.C., were posed to all air travelers, even people very unlikely to fit
any dangerous profile. One possible justification for this over-inclusion is so that those who TSA agents actually
suspected of being dangerous are not tipped off.
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law correctly even when the party representatives are falling short on their own duties to
others. 99
II. CURIOUS COMBINATIONS
We now have a sense of why asking and telling are sometimes regulated, although the
reasons are diverse. Often the regulatory goal is to encourage or discourage information flows,
sometimes with a further goal of influencing either the use of information or instead the strength
of relationships based on contract, agency, and trust. In these cases, we might hope or expect that
asking and telling norms will point in the same direction—encouraging both asking and telling
so that key information will be used, for instance, or discouraging both so that it will not.
Sometimes, however, the goal is different. For instance, asking norms may reflect worries about
coercive pressure rather than worries about information use or trust relationships per se.
Furthermore, agency relationships can generate a variety of asking and telling norms that might
be defended, especially if observers cannot know whether disclosure or secrecy is best before a
particular conflict arises. In these cases, there is much less reason to hope or expect that asking
and telling norms will point in the same direction. And, realistically, some combinations will be
ill-considered or the goals confused and compromised by administrative convenience and other
factors.
The next step is to draw from the general lessons suggested above and investigate more
concretely how asking and telling norms interact. Even less theorizing exists on asking-andtelling combinations than on asking or telling in isolation. 100 And of course people will disagree
about the best explanation and the proper norms for many situations. But the clusters of reasons
that we have identified provide a rough structure for further inquiry. Moreover, by examining the
extreme corner cases where each of the norms is either “Must” or “Don’t,” we get a better
picture of how asking and telling norms can and should fit together, sometimes in
counterintuitive ways. And, ultimately, we might better understand the scope and justifications
for allowing people to ask and/or tell in relative freedom. To show where we are headed, Figure
1 presents a spectrum of examples, with shaded cells denoting combinations that will receive less
of our attention. Some of our characterizations might be debated, but each cell can be filled for
some set of circumstances.

99

See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) (“Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather
than adversarial.”); see also United States v. Romero, 749 F.3d 900, 906-07 (10th Cir. 2014) (involving police
officers’ duty to investigate whether a person has authority to permit entry, if presented with ambiguous facts),
citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 8.3(g), at 180 (4th ed. 2004).
100
An exception is the work in linguistics on question-response pairs. See Stenstrom, supra note 22, at 30608 (collecting and summarizing linguistics sources). Another is game theory on Don’t Ask, May Tell, discussed
below.
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FIGURE 1: SOCIAL AND LEGAL NORMS FOR ASKING AND TELLING
MUST ASK

MAY ASK

MUST TELL

MAY TELL

DON’T TELL

toddler’s age

friend’s injury

employee background checks,
income taxes

police interrogations (as to job
duties and formal rights)

certain journalist/politician
interactions

restricted markets (e.g.,
alcohol)

certain disability
accommodations

STD before intercourse
FOIA requests

code of silence conflicts
civil discovery plus privilege
(as to the attorneys)
therapeutic nondisclosure

social norms for many settings

FHA on neighborhood racial
demographics

legal norms for most settings

non-disclosure agreements

marital infidelity

acquaintance’s disability

employee’s disability plus tort
duty to warn

family status in job interview

physical appearance in certain
orchestral auditions

abortion disclosure laws
child abuse reporting
Brady disclosures

DON’T ASK

FHA on homebuyer
preferences regarding race or
religion
employer questioning
regarding worker preferences
on unionization drive

employment law plus social
norms for some protected
classes
old military policy (partially)
inadmissible evidence at trial

A. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT)
Start with the extreme combination that should be easiest to rationalize: DADT has an
established game theoretic justification, at least if we assume a don’t-use rule. Douglas Baird,
Robert Gertner, and Randy Picker have considered problems of unraveling when the legal norms
are what we would call “Don’t Ask, May Tell, Don’t Use.” 101 They observed that sometimes
formal law prohibits questions about traits—such as a federally-funded school asking about an
applicant’s marital status—without prohibiting people from offering the very same
information. 102 This combination looks senseless in the face of strategic behavior, insofar as
anyone who knows they will get an advantage from telling will do so while observers will
rationally assume that those who remain silent have the disfavored trait. Under the unraveling
scenario, people end up signaling their type regardless of whether they are asked or whether they
remain silent. The authors suggest that “[r]ules limiting the transfer of verifiable information

101

See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-93.
See id. at 92 (listing, as well, state law restricting questions about religious or political affiliation of
applicants for government jobs, and evidentiary rules restricting questions at trial about victim sexual history). The
authors treat evidentiary privileges as “a form of inquiry limit.” Id. In contrast, we treat such privileges as a may-tell
norm. It makes a difference to us whether a lawyer is forbidden from asking about a privileged matter, as well as
whether another lawyer or a witness has a right not to tell. See infra Part II.D.2.
102
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should be two-sided” 103 (DADT, in other words), if there are to be legal rules at all. Stopping the
questioning inhibits indications of what is expected to be told, stopping the telling helps prevent
unravelling disclosures, and both norms can work together to restrict the flow of information on
which decisions should not be made. So does our law ever adopt DADT? Does it matter?
1. Military Policy
The most famous illustration of DADT in law is the now-repealed policy on gay people
serving in the United States military. But the military’s policy was never a model of information
control, let alone a commitment against the use of such information.
Shortly after President Clinton took office, he ordered his Secretary of Defense to draft
an executive order “ending discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in determining who
may serve in the Armed Forces.” 104 No such don’t-use rule was ever achieved. Instead the
Defense Department adopted a narrow don’t-ask rule: “Applicants for enlistment, appointment,
or induction shall not be asked or required to reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual,
or bisexual.” 105 The don’t-tell rule, too, was narrow. Congress warned that “the presence in the
armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to . . . military capability.” 106 In addition to provisions
attempting to cement a military policy of separation for certain kinds of homosexual conduct and
same-sex marriage, 107 which are close to must-use rules, the legislation also imposed a don’t-tell
rule. The statute required separation from the armed forces if the member was found to have
“stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect,” unless the member
demonstrated that he or she did not engage in “homosexual acts.” 108 The statute also announced
support for the administration’s don’t-ask rule. 109 The policy was challenged in court on
constitutional grounds, including free speech, 110 but the DADT combination survived until the
Obama administration.

103

Id. at 93.
Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 23
(Jan. 29, 1993) (ordering a study and consultation, as well).
105
Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1304.26, Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and
Induction § E1.2.8.1 (Dec. 21, 1993) (as amended Mar. 4, 1994) (emphasis added).
106
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 103-160, § 571(a)(1), 107 Stat.
1670 (Nov. 30, 1993) (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15)).
107
See id. (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1), (3)).
108
Id. (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2)). The caveat to the don’t-tell rule was “unless there is a
further finding . . . that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.” Id. Subsequently adopted
regulations declared that a member’s statement that he or she is a homosexual “creates a rebuttable presumption” of
such conduct, attempt, intent, or propensity; and that rebuttal would be considered in light of third-party testimony
regarding the member’s past conduct, among other evidence. Dep’t of Defense Instruction No. 1332.40, Separation
Procedures for Regular and Reserve Commissioned Officers § E2.3.1.2 & 3.1.2.3 (Sept. 16, 1997).
109
10 U.S.C. § 571(d)(1) (formerly codified in the note after 10 U.S.C. § 654). This sense-of-Congress
clause went on to state, “but the Secretary of Defense may reinstate . . . questions as he considers appropriate if the
Secretary determines that it is necessary to do so in order to effectuate the policy set forth” in the legislation. Id.
110
See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 62-65 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting free-speech claims against the
don’t-tell part of the policy). Cook relied heavily on a supposed government purpose and justification of using such
speech as evidence of homosexual conduct, not any bad effects of such speech itself on military operations. See id.
104
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If we take as given a may-use rule under the old policy, perhaps as a timid bow to
political reality, 111 then how bad of a compromise was DADT? Truly effective constraints on
asking and telling about service member sexual orientation could deprive military officers of
reliable information on which to discriminate. Following the implications of standard game
theory, a broad prohibition on any service member or applicant telling anyone about their sexual
orientation would prevent unraveling. And a broad prohibition on anyone in the military asking
about any service member’s or applicant’s sexual orientation would reduce the risks of
browbeaten responses, not to mention defensive falsehoods.
Whatever the merits of that hypothetical compromise, the actual DADT policy had
nothing like the foregoing breadth. The don’t-ask rule restricted questioning only at the
recruitment and enlistment stages, not afterward. There was apparently no formal restriction on
military personnel asking each other about or otherwise investigating sexual orientation—
although implementing regulations might channel investigative authority to particular officers. 112
As for the don’t-tell rule, it applied only to service member statements about their own sexual
orientation, not to one person gossiping about another. Military and civilian informants were left
unregulated. Nor did the rule instruct service members who were not gay to not tell. Given the
other problems, unraveling perhaps should be the last worry about the policy. But it would not be
shocking if the old policy encouraged (true and false) advertising of one’s heterosexuality.
Several of these shortfalls showed up in Witt v. Air Force, 113 which took constitutional
objections seriously. The District Court explained that a (civilian) husband sent an email to the
Air Force Chief of Staff claiming that Major Margaret Witt had had an affair with his wife.
During the subsequent investigation, the Air Force collected information about Witt’s
relationship with yet another woman, and Witt was later honorably discharged. 114 The actual
DADT policy hardly eliminated the ability of third parties to circulate information about gay sex,
or the authority of military officers to investigate gay sex. We can say this while ignoring any
violations of the formal DADT rules. Perhaps no critical mass of politicians and military leaders
wanted the military’s practices to change appreciably in the first place.
Thus there were many reasons to hope for the disintegration of the old policy. Most
Americans now oppose the underlying idea of excluding people from military service simply
because they have homosexual sex, might do so, or marry a same-sex partner—whether or not
they tell anyone else. 115 This position indicates a don’t-use rule. Plus, given a history of
discriminatory military practices, it probably makes sense to add a don’t-ask rule regarding
sexual orientation, at the very least for those responsible for military recruitment, enlistment, and
discipline thereafter. And one might think that a Don’t Ask, Don’t Use combination is
adequately protective such that a Don’t Tell rule is not appropriate. This would allow service
111

Compare Yoshino, supra note 3, at 542, which recognizes that political power and visibility can be
endogenous, and claims that “[t]he state forges a link between gay invisibility and gay powerlessness whenever it
participates in closeting homosexuals, making the invisibility of gays mandatory rather than discretionary.”
112
See BRANDON A. DAVIS, DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL 3 (2010).
113
739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1312 (W.D. Wa. 2010) (finding facts after a trial on Witt’s constitutional claims).
114
See id.
115
See, e.g., Lucy Madison, Most Support Gays Serving Openly in Military, Says CBS News Poll, CBS
NEWS, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-support-gays-serving-openly-in-military-says-cbs-newspoll/; Lymari Morales, In U.S., 67% Support Repealing “Don't Ask, Don't Tell”, GALLUP POLITICS (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/145130/Support-Repealing-Dont-Ask-Dont-Tell.aspx.
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members and applicants to make their own judgments about how much of their sexual
orientation to disclose and to whom, without formal law suggesting negative consequences. On
the other hand, those supporting Don’t Ask, Don’t Use might reasonably lean toward a Don’t
Tell rule, as a way of minimizing the risk of unauthorized discrimination. Perhaps a few people
who still want gay people excluded from military service might compromise if a Don’t Tell rule
is part of the package. 116
Today’s policy has different problems. The military is appropriately sticking with its
don’t-ask rule at the recruitment and enlistment stages. 117 And it seems that the military is
advertising a welcoming attitude toward gay service members. 118 Furthermore, Congress and the
President repealed the don’t-tell part of the policy, 119 so that a service member’s mere
announcement that she is gay is no longer grounds for separation. It seems that gay service
members can live their lives more openly, if they choose. And perhaps unraveling is unlikely or
tolerable if the military really will not discriminate on sexual orientation. Unfortunately, the
military’s commitment against use is not totally clear. True, the statutory repeal did remove the
old references to homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage as requiring separation. 120 But the
Uniform Code of Military Justice still includes sodomy (“unnatural carnal copulation”) as an
offense subject to court martial. 121 Although this sodomy prohibition is not restricted to same-sex
contact, it is also not textually limited to, say, nonconsensual or public sex. 122 The Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 was a misnomer. Thankfully, it left in place a don’t-ask rule. But
without quite switching to a don’t use rule, the may-tell rule is less than comforting.
2. Antidiscrimination law
As a structural matter, contemporary antidiscrimination law might look even worse than
the military’s DADT policy. Take Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This historic statute
is designed to restrict employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, and pregnancy. 123 But the statute itself does not expressly prohibit employers from asking
116

See generally David A. Strauss, Do It But Don’t Tell Me (2009) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the authors).
117
See Dep’t of Defense, Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT): Quick Reference Guide 1 (Sept. 20,
2011) (“Sexual orientation is a personal and private matter. DoD components, including the Services are not
authorized to request, collect, or maintain information about the sexual orientation of Service members except when
it is an essential part of an otherwise appropriate investigation or other official action.”).
118
See Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., Remarks at the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Pride Month
Event in the Pentagon Auditorium (June 25, 2013) (“Our nation has always benefited from the service of gay and
lesbian soldiers, sailors, airmen, and coast guardsmen, and Marines. Now they can serve openly, with full honor,
integrity and respect. This makes our military and our nation stronger, much stronger.”),
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5262.
119
See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. Section 2(e) of this
Act indicates that it does not create a private cause of action.
120
See 10 U.S.C. §654 (1993), repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-321, §2(b), (f)(1), 124 Stat. 3516.
121
10 U.S.C. § 925.
122
Cf. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 208 (U.S. Armed Forces Ct. App. 2004) (allowing court
martial for sodomy with a subordinate and distinguishing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)); United
States v. Harvey, 67 M.J. 758, 762-63 (U.S. Air Force Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (allowing court martial of a
representative of the military abroad for fellatio with a foreign national, as conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman).
123
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
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employees or potential employees about any of those subjects. 124 Nor does the statute prohibit
employees or potential employees from telling employers about those aspects of themselves.
Formally speaking, these major civil rights laws appear to establish “May Ask, May Tell, Don’t
Use” regimes. A cagey observer might wonder whether the latter prohibition on information use
can be assured while asking and telling remain unregulated. This is the unraveling concern all
over again.
Upon closer examination, however, formal law is not so permissive. Federal law does
restrict employer questions about disability, 125 and questions about sex and family status may be
limited as a condition for receiving federal funding. 126 More broadly, many state laws prohibit
employer questions about a number of protected characteristics. Several states, such as
California, prohibit employers from asking questions that indicate discrimination or
discriminatory intent on various grounds including race, color, sex, disability, age, religion,
national origin, marital status, and sexual orientation. 127 Other state laws incorporate specific
restrictions on employer questions regarding protected employee characteristics. 128 Also worth
noting, a few states have begun to restrict employer requests for social media passwords. 129 But
even in these cases, employees and others seem legally free to disclose. The basic pattern in
formal antidiscrimination law is to regulate asking only sometimes and telling not at all.

124

See 1 GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW AND REGULATION § 2:16 (2014 update) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT

LAW].
125

See infra text accompanying notes 156-160; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5 (regulating creditor requests for
information, with caveats); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (same). The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
which is supposed to protect employees from adverse employment action, appears to fit a “Don’t Ask, May Tell,
Don’t Use” category. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (restricting use); id. § 2000ff-1(b) (prohibiting employer requests
for and purchases of genetic information regarding an employee or employee family member, albeit with several
exceptions).
126
See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(c)(4) (declaring that schools receiving funds from the Department of
Education shall not, for example, “make pre-admission inquiry as to the marital status of an applicant for admission,
including whether such applicant is ‘Miss’ or ‘Mrs.’” and “may make pre-admission inquiry as to the sex of an
applicant for admission, but only if such inquiry is made equally of such applicants of both sexes and if the results of
such inquiry are not used in connection with discrimination prohibited by this part”) (emphasis added); see also 20
U.S.C. § 1682 (granting agency rulemaking authority in this area).
127
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(d); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402(d) (similar but without
listing marital status); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(3) (similar but without listing age, marital status, or sexual
orientation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2206(2) (similar but without listing disability or sexual orientation,
while adding height and weight); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2014) (similar but adding military status and
“predisposing genetic characteristics”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-6(a)(9) (covering pregnancy and
family responsibilities).
128
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2206(2)(a) (prohibiting employer inquiries concerning race,
color, sex, religion, national origin, and marital status, plus height and weight); MINN. STAT. §363A.08, subds. 4(1)
(similar but limited to pre-employment questions, not listing height and weight, and adding creed, public assistance
status, familial status, disability, and sexual orientation); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 955(b)(1) (similar but limited to preemployment questions and not listing, for example, sexual orientation); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a6(a)(11) (prohibiting employer requests for genetic information); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 561(b)(1) (regarding jobapplicant health coverage). Massachusetts, by agency rule, restricts a variety of employer questions. See 804 CODE
MASS. REG. 3.01(8)(g) & 3.02 (presenting a detailed grid of permissible and impermissible employer questions on
age, sex, race, disability, criminal records, and many other topics).
129
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b)(1) (enacted by 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 618); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 3-712; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135; ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124.
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Of course, formal law does not fully describe the real world of employment practices.
However prevalent Don’t Ask might be as a formal legal command, many employers seem to get
the message that certain questions are inappropriate or even unlawful. And this impression might
be important regardless of the enforceability of any don’t-use rule. Acknowledging that Title VII
does not per se outlaw pre-employment questions concerning race, color, religion, or national
origin, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission nevertheless states that it “regard[s]
such inquiries with extreme disfavor . . . . [A]n applicant’s race, religion and the like are totally
irrelevant to his or her ability or qualifications as a prospective employee, and no useful purpose
is served by eliciting such information.” 130
Is that message penetrating? Not to everyone, certainly. But consider the rule-of-thumb
advice for hiring procedures from an online resource directed at startup companies. 131 The long
list of bad questions is remarkable:
In general, companies should avoid inquiries about protected activities or characteristics,
except to keep records required by equal employment opportunity laws. In making
inquiries to applicants, the following general rules should always be borne in mind:
• Companies may ask about current address and permanent address. They may not ask
whether applicant lives with anyone or whether applicant owns home or rents.
• Companies may ask for name and position of spouse employed by the company or a
competitor of the company.
• Companies may not request personal sexual information or requests for sexual conduct.
• Companies cannot ask about marital status; children, dependents, child care
arrangements; whether the applicant is pregnant, using birth control, or planning to
have children; names of spouse or children; or child support obligations.
• Companies cannot ask about race, ethnicity, lineage, or ancestry. They cannot ask
about languages that an applicant can speak, write, read, or understand unless a
language other than English is required for the job.
• Companies . . . cannot ask how educational expenses were paid or whether applicant
still owes educational loans.
• . . . . [C]ompanies generally may not ask about the number of “sick days” employee
used in last job, the number of workdays missed to care for children, or whether the
applicant took any leaves of absence from last job.
• Companies may only ask about financial or credit information if it is clearly jobrelated.
• Companies may ask about the number and kinds of convictions, if companies assure
that convictions do not necessarily disqualify applicant. They cannot ask about the
number and type of arrests.
• Companies can only ask about applicant’s height or weight, if legitimate job
qualification. 132
130

EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 124, § 2:16 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 29 CFR §1604.7
(presenting EEOC guidance on pre-employment inquires related to sex that express discrimination); King v. Trans
World Airlines, 738 F.2d 255, 258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (dicta relying thereon).
131
See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE BUSINESS COUNSELOR’S GUIDE TO ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT
preface (Thompson Reuters/West 2013 update).
132
Id. § 30:34. A longer and more nuanced list was posted by Michigan Tech, What You Can and What You
Can’t—Legal/Illegal Interview Questions, Staff Hiring Process (May 16, 2013),
http://www.mtu.edu/equity/pdfs/whatyoucanandcantasklongversion8-12-04.pdf. State law and/or conditions on

– 25 –

January 16, 2015 Draft

At least some of these off-limits questions are drawn from EEOC guidance or lower court
cases, 133 so the liability fear is not baseless. The list directs employers to the safe side of the
street.
Quite a few employers must have the sense that many questions present intolerable risks,
whether or not posing those questions is unlawful in a strict sense. Some of these risks are
litigation-related. Sometimes questions can be used later in court as evidence of unlawful
discrimination, even if law does not outright prohibit the question. In one interchange from the
1980s (easily mistaken for the 1880s), a supervisor reportedly asked a job applicant “how her
husband felt about her applying for the job and whether she planned to have additional
children.” 134 Despite this plaintiff’s loss on appeal, more-sophisticated and litigation-averse
employers will avoid producing such evidence. Perhaps these incentives against employer
questioning count as a functional don’t-ask norm. 135
Employer risks go beyond anticipated lawsuits. Many employers will self-regulate when
questions would suggest something disreputable about management’s curiosities and values.
Sending those messages can drive down morale and restrict the pool of willing employees. In
E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 136 a case pending before the Supreme Court, the
company alleges that its store managers are instructed “not to assume facts about prospective
employees” and also “not to ask applicants about their religion.” 137 Although stifling such
questions can prevent constructive dialogue about workplace accommodations—in this case,
wearing a hijab in a preppy clothing store that has something against employee “caps” 138—
employer questions about religion are problematic for more than one reason. There are litigation
as well as other economic risks from a bad signal to prospective employees. Applicants will
wonder why a clothing store’s management is interested in religion, and often infer an
unwelcoming explanation. 139 We are not under the impression that don’t-ask norms prevail in
federal funding might explain such care with questioning, but litigation risk aversion and other moral commitments
might be at work. See also 30 Interview Questions You Can’t Ask and 30 Sneaky, Legal Alternatives to Get the Same
Info, HR WORLD.COM, http://www.hrworld.com/features/30-interview-questions-111507 (last visited Nov. 10,
2014) (providing a provocative list of verboten interview questions, though the “sneaky” alternatives mentioned in
the title consist largely of focusing on information pertinent to job performance).
133
See, e.g., EEOCCM s 2-II, Cognizable Claims (2009); 29 C.F.R. § 1600 (2014); Barnes v. Cochran, 944
F. Supp. 897, 904-05 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (involving the ADA). The EEOC lacks statutory authority to implement Title
VII via rulemaking; its opinions on the correct understanding of Title VII receive variable Skidmore deference from
courts, which depends on several factors. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991).
134
Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 364-65 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
135
In a similar self-protective vein are DADT norms that arise because of concerns over maintaining an
executive’s plausible deniability. White House employees might avoid disclosing envelope-pushing conduct to the
President, and a suspicious President may know not to ask hard questions or be barred structurally from doing so,
precisely so that the President can be insulated if the conduct later comes to light. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Structural
Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV. 887, 914 (2012).
136
731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3089 (Oct. 2, 2014).
137
Id. at 1112 (reporting the company’s averments).
138
Id. at 1111; see id. at 1116, 1121, 1123, 1134-35, 1143 (granting judgment to an employer partly
because the prospective employee did not tell the employer that she wore a hijab for religious reasons, and relying
on EEOC warnings against employer questions about religion). There is, unfortunately, nothing per se unlawful
about dress codes following “a classic East Coast collegiate style of clothing.” Id. at 1111.
139
Of course, the economic and morale effects are different for businesses attempting to develop niche
markets based on religion.
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every workplace on every topic implicated by civil rights legislation, or that limited questioning
shows no unlawful discrimination. But it would be unrealistic to ignore social norms in trying to
understand the effect of civil rights law on employer questions. 140
The real-life norm on the telling side is likewise far from “may” in some of these settings.
A regional social practice of tolerating discussion about one’s religion, for instance, might carry
over into the workplace regardless of the use norm in formal law, but only in those regions.
Wedding rings and family photos can be found in many, but not all, workplaces. Similarly, it is
our impression from having interviewed many candidates for jobs in legal academia that
applicants regularly volunteer information about their marital status, especially when it is helpful
to their chances (a spouse who already has to relocate to the interviewing employer’s city, for
instance). That said, the sensitivity of many people in many workplaces about many of these
topics will lean the norms toward “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Whatever employers might glean
from social network postings and third-party databases (ask-C options), employees will not
always advertise to employers that they are not pregnant, for instance. Returning to religion and
disability, job applicants may have more than one reason to not tell. Both religion and disability
implicate socially sensitive topics and also provide a basis for legal claims to reasonable
accommodations. If they can help it, some number of applicants will not foreground traits that
appear to make them more costly employees, especially when job opportunities are scarce. These
employee inhibitions conceivably are a crude way of screening out low-value or non-meritorious
claims to accommodation against standard operating procedure, and thus a hijab-wearing job
applicant might be sending a rather strong message about her religious preferences, 141 but social
norms and legal incentives certainly influence the real world of Q&A regardless.
Thus antidiscrimination law might operate quite differently in practice than did the
military’s tattered DADT policy. In the employment setting, frequently social norms supplement
legal norms against information use. In contrast, a high degree of openness in discussing one’s
(hetero)sexuality in the military would have undercut formal protections against investigation
and disclosure. A combination of legal and social norms might regulate information flows more
sensibly than legal rules alone would. Of course we have not exhausted the analysis and evidence
on these matters, 142 but the above discussion helps point a way forward.
B. Don’t Ask, Must Tell (DAMT)
One might imagine situations in which employers, employees, and others freely discuss
matters of race, religion, family, and disability with no fear that the resulting circulation of
information will be used to make troubling decisions. But people’s trust tends not to stretch that
far. In contrast, many personal relationships are meant to rest on at least this much trust. To be
sure, trust-based relationships can suggest May Ask, May Tell norms, but sometimes that sort of
140

Affirmative action programs and compliance efforts complicate the analysis. Sometimes employers are
authorized by law to collect data on potential or current employees to operate an affirmative action program, or to
monitor the organization’s efforts to comply with some other legal obligation.
141
One of the issues in the case is the likelihood that an applicant is wearing a hijab for non-religious
reasons. See id. at 1118-19.
142
For instance, genetic information seems to call for special consideration. Wide accessibility to genetic
testing might be too recent for any reliable social norms to have developed, and it’s possible that too few employees
will obtain such information about themselves for the unraveling dynamic to happen. But a don’t-ask norm might be
defended, as it can be in other circumstances, as a way of protecting employees from nominal questions that are
more like troubling commands.
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freedom would undercut the intended relationship. Although it might seem bizarre compared to
DADT, where asking and telling norms both work toward bottling up information, important
aspects of personal relationships are supposed to be governed by DAMT, where asking is
inhibited while telling is obligatory.
1. Personal relationships
Consider infidelity. Ideally, a person should not ask his or her spouse or romantic partner,
“Are you cheating on me?”—just as a flat accusation is ordinarily inappropriate. But according
to mainstream American morality, such partners should disclose an affair if it happens. 143 The
question is almost unavoidably accusatory or, at minimum, conveys suspicion in a way that
undercuts trust. A question can show suspicion as strongly as any declaration. 144 At the same
time, marriage and other personal relationships often depend on a commitment to monogamy,
along with a supplemental commitment to disclose conduct that violates such underlying
commitments. If the parties to the relationship can trust each other to disclose such misconduct to
each other, then they can avoid the discomforting and even destructive effects of questions that
are loaded with suspicion. 145
In fact, evidence indicates that DAMT might save relationships. When a breach of trust
occurs among dating couples, one study shows that the romantic relationship is roughly twice as
likely to be repaired if the cheating partner discloses voluntarily rather than waiting to be
confronted with questions from the suspicious partner. 146 The voluntary disclosure by the
cheating partner contains the disclosure rather than airing it publicly, demonstrates the cheating
partner’s remorse and perhaps interest in reconciliation, and evinces limits to the cheater’s
143

Many personal relationships are not mainstream or conventional in the way described in the text. See
Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004). Some relationships are romantically or sexually more open, and some people within those
relationships may prefer Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell or May Ask, May Tell or something else. See id. at 327 (quoting
Marny Hall, Turning Down the Jezebel Decibels, in THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN RELATIONSHIPS,
NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX 47, 54-55 (Marcia Munson & Judity P. Stelboum, eds., 1999), describing a
couple’s informational logs of their encounters, made available for optional perusal by the other partner).
144
Although asking suspicious questions might not do much good toward getting the truth, the questions
seem to up the stakes for misbehaving partners. Lying or deception would be added to infidelity and nondisclosure.
In this sense, these questions indicate a relationship at risk but not yet dissolved. Note that adultery was and still is a
fault-based reason for divorce, and is still a crime in approximately half the states. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 5.02 cmt. e (2002) [hereinafter FAMILY DISSOLUTION]; Adultery in New England: Love
Free or Die, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2014, at 80. A false accusation of adultery might give rise to a defamation
per se claim—but surely tort law is no influence on questioning as opposed to outright accusing partners regarding
adultery.
145
While we regard DAMT as the aspirational social norm governing infidelity, see Ryan B. Seedall et al.,
Disclosing Extra-Dyadic Involvement (EDI): Understanding Attitudes, Subjective Norms, and Perceived Behavioral
Control, 35 CONTEMP. FAM. THER. 745, 754 fig. 1 (2013) (finding very strong beliefs among research subjects in the
moral obligation to disclose cheating to a partner); cf. Mark H. Butler et al., Facilitated Disclosure versus Clinical
Accommodation of Infidelity: An Early Pivot Point in Couple Therapy, 35 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 125, 13742 (2009) (discussing the morality and consequences of nondisclosure), it could be that nonadherence to this norm is
quite prevalent.
146
See Walid A. Afifi et al., Identity Concerns Following a Severe Relational Transgression: The Role of
Discovery Method for the Relational Outcomes of Infidelity, 18 J. SOCIAL & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 291, 300
(2001) (“[U]nsolicited partner disclosure again produced the least damaging relational results (43.5% dissolution
rate following discovery) . . . . [D]iscovering the infidelity through solicited information-seeking (86%) or by
walking in on the infidelity (83%) . . . were most likely to lead to relationship dissolution.”).
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willingness to deceive the partner. All of these factors made forgiveness and continuation of the
relationship more likely. 147 To be sure, we do not know how much of this correlation between
disclosure mechanisms and relationship survival is causal, we cannot be sure whether
relationship survival is a good thing in these contexts, and if the likelihood of eventual detection
is low enough, a cheating partner may still elect not to disclose. 148 But voluntary disclosure is
both morally justified (because it is something the unaware partner usually would want to know
and in the case of a conventional marriage has a right to know) and likely furthers the interests of
a cheating partner who hopes for reconciliation.
Affairs are a fairly narrow illustration, but DAMT probably covers a sizeable chunk of
our social lives. Theoretically, you could always ask a spouse, partner, friend, or roommate if
they took whatever you cannot find at the moment, but nobody goes that far. At least when the
implied accusation is untrue or the suspicion off-base, these questions may provoke resentment,
wasteful efforts to appear “beyond reproach” in the first place, or emotional distance and
ultimately separation—the opposite of what trust relationships aspire to. In fact, a must-tell norm
could boost the inference of accusation from questions about misbehavior. If spouses A and B
both know that misconduct is supposed to be spontaneously disclosed, then spouse A’s question
about misconduct communicates suspicion about both underlying misconduct and the failure to
disclose that misconduct. Believing that we are in a DAMT situation can increase sensitivity and
raise stakes, while also helping bind people together.
DAMT also occurs outside of intimate personal relationships, although in less clear
forms. One example is Catholic confession. To reconcile with God after the commission of sin,
Church members must confess to a priest. But it seems that priests are not in the habit of
investigating parishioners or asking them point-blank about sinful behavior outside of the
confession context. The sinner must periodically initiate the confession procedure to obtain the
sacrament and square up with God, which is optional only in the sense that a baptized person
could choose to go without confession and risk damnation. 149 The Catholic Church’s position
that the sacrament requires confession to a Church-employed specialist and not a layperson (or
directly to God) was one objection that spurred the Reformation. 150 But putting aside that
controversy, we can see this sort of DAMT combination in the religious confession practices of
non-Catholics as well as the non-religious confessions of many other people. 151 Even if secular,
confession to a friend can be an emotional relief and perhaps even a mutual obligation to share
secrets. On the other hand, friends should be shy to fish for revelations of misbehavior, unless
honestly thought to be in the best interest of their counterpart. The fit with DAMT is not perfect,

147

See id. at 295, 301-05.
See id. at 305.
149
See 1983 CODE c.960, CODEX IURIS CANONICI (1983).
150
See LADISLAS ORSY, THE EVOLVING CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (1978) (discussing
change from a public confession to reenter the community, available for only some sins, and available only once in a
lifetime, to private confessions with a priest repeatedly). Some economists of religion suggest that the practice
involves rent seeking or other risks, while others may note that priests are specialists who deliver individualized
service and that the practice may have evolved in response to changing demand and circumstances. Compare
Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., et al., An Economic Analysis of the Protestant Reformation, 110 J. POL. ECON. 646, 653-55
(2002), with Benito Arruñada, Specialization and Rent Seeking in Moral Enforcement: The Case of Confession, 48 J.
SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 443, 447-48 (2009).
151
See Arruñada, supra note 150, at 446 (describing confession as a near-universal practice across history).
148

– 29 –

January 16, 2015 Draft

but these extensions show trust relationships with channels for disclosure of misconduct without
prying questions.
However prevalent, DAMT seems fragile. DAMT norms can be skirted or flouted,
sometimes with serious consequences. On the asking side, accusatory questions can be replaced
with softer inquiries such as, “Hey, where were you last night?” 152 These substitutes erode the
don’t-ask category in practice, and may put pressure to be accusatory on the initial target of
suspicion—as in, “Why do you ask?” More significantly, the must-tell part of DAMT is much
harder to police than the don’t-ask part. 153 The duty to tell is conditional on misconduct by B that
A, by hypothesis, does not know about. Whether spouse A has posed an accusatory question to
spouse B will basically always be apparent to spouse B, but whether spouse B is failing to
disclose an affair may not be apparent to spouse A. Furthermore, the class of people benefiting
from don’t-ask norms might be relatively powerful and have an interest in ignoring the must-tell
norms, or falsely advertising their strength. 154 DAMT under those conditions can be a scam to
maintain cover for infidelity. The DAMT combination needs a mechanism for incentivizing
compliance or matching up people who have internalized these commitments already. 155 Even
when DAMT is effectively implemented, a don’t-ask norm may interfere with one person’s
communication of honest concern to another, and so DAMT usually comes with costs and
important risks.
None of this means that DAMT is irrational or impossible. The combination seems
relatively widespread in intimate relationships. Moreover, the fragility of DAMT might help
people value the relationship highly when the combination seems to be working, perhaps because
success is elusive and failure is emotionally serious. But fragility and high stakes are not strong
recommendations for DAMT as a generally applicable combination of norms.
2. Workplace regulations
Perhaps because of this fragility, law is different from social norms. DAMT is difficult to
identify anywhere in law and, when DAMT legal norms do emerge, they might be a mistake or a
regrettable side effect of regulation.
Consider employment law. Employer questions are only occasionally prohibited by law,
but the Americans with Disabilities Act is a partial exception. 156 The statute instructs employers
to not “make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a
152

Cf. supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the tear-jerker speech in Innis).
Cf. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 95 (suggesting that mandatory disclosure rules might not be effective);
DEBORAH M. ANAPOL, POLYAMORY 3 (1997) (“Lies, deceit, guilt, unilateral decisions and broken commitments are
so commonplace in classic American-style monogamy that responsible nonmonogamy may sound like an
oxymoron.”).
154
Cf. Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787,
2787 (2008) (“Because race and gender intersect to determine an individual’s value in the romantic marketplace, the
two partners are unlikely to be similarly situated in terms of their options for leaving the relationship should it
become unhappy.”).
155
Among the possibilities are attempting to signal must-tell commitments (perhaps by disclosing other
misconduct that clearly would not have been detected); or adjusting the expected severity of social sanctions
depending on whether the misconduct was voluntarily disclosed before detection or suspicion. There seems to be no
perfect solution, but we expect people to make efforts to make DAMT work given its apparent value.
156
See Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 381-86 (1997).
153
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disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability” unless “shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.” 157 The statute thus demands a job-related justification for
such questions without flatly prohibiting them. 158 Employers can still get into trouble for asking
questions, however. In Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 159 a district court held that
an employer could not ask employees to disclose the legal prescription medication that they use,
unless the employer could show a relationship to the job and business necessity. 160 Looking
slightly beyond formal law, we can see a significant Don’t Ask norm at work. Regulated
employers will not always be able to discern the legal difference between asking about a
disability as opposed to something else, and between asking an economically justified question
as opposed to something else. 161 Again, concerns about litigation risk can prompt employers to
avoid questions arguably related to certain employee traits, not to mention social norms in favor
of silence. 162
More difficult is identifying Must Tell rules for employees. Employees rarely have a
legal duty to disclose information about traits that employers should not (or will not) ask
about. 163 A possible exception involves workplace hazards. There, tort law might overlap with
employment discrimination law. Employees with certain disabilities can present increased risks
to others if these conditions are not disclosed and adjusted for. An employee with a
communicable disease might be perfectly capable of performing many job duties effectively,
efficiently, and safely, if precautions are taken to reduce the risk of infection to a given level.
Indeed those precautions might be necessary for the employee to comply with ordinary tort
duties, including the duty to warn others of known risks. 164 An employer might not take adequate
157

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4); see also id. § 12112(d)(2) (covering job applicants, and clarifying that “a
covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions”).
158
The statute separately allows drug testing. See id. § 12112(d)(1) & (2); see also EEOC, Enforcement
Guidance: Disability Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) 21 (July 27, 2000) (question 8) (recognizing circumstances where it is permissible to require
employees in positions affecting public safety to report taking medication),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
159
920 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Colo. 1996).
160
See id. at 1154-55.
161
Complicating matters, there is equivocal authority for the proposition that an employer may actually
have a duty to investigate the possibility of making accommodations for employees with disabilities, once the
disability seems obvious. See Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi, J.); see
also Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). But cf. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., 165
F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that an employee cannot “expect the employer to read [her] mind” about
desired and needed accommodations) (internal quotation marks omitted). This would amount to Must Ask, May Tell
for disability law under certain conditions. See supra Figure 1.
162
Some protected traits are transparent to observers, and so employer questions about them seem
unnecessary, a legal prohibition bootless if the goal is reinforcing anti-use norms, and employee disclosure irrelevant
or gratuitous. Few employers need to ask about an employee’s race to know what it is, in a socially constructed
sense. But for more opaque employee traits—such as religion, national origin, sexual orientation, family status,
pregnancy, genetic information, and certain types of disability—posing questions might yield new information.
163
Here we are contrasting legal duties to disclose from legal benefits conditioned on disclosure—for
instance, a disabled person might have to inform others to recover in tort, see Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn. 1997), or to receive employment accommodations, see Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001), not to mention Social Security disability payments.
164
Cf. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1391, 1395-96 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (addressing AIDS and sexual
partners); Franklin v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 428, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (addressing small pox from a stranger to a
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precautions unless the disease is disclosed (e.g., requiring safety gloves or masks). At the same
time, the employer might be deterred from asking about either employee diseases or employee
need for disability-based accommodations because of a perceived litigation risk.
Strictly speaking, even this workplace hazard scenario might not fit the DAMT
combination. The must-tell rule is derived from the application of general tort duties, while the
don’t-ask rule is partially an unintended side effect of litigation risks in discrimination law. So
this “example” of DAMT looks more like an unintended consequence than an intelligently
designed combination in law. That said, DAMT could have a plausible defense in this workplace
context even if it does not arise by design. More than one regulatory goal is in play. The don’task rule might serve an anti-coercion mission that justifiably constrains employers, whether or
not over-deterrence occurs, while the must-tell rule might represent an exceptional yet justifiable
regulation directed at employees to prevent public harm while avoiding employer browbeating.
Note that these justifications do not involve building a delicate trust relationship between
employers and employees, but perhaps the confluence of rules and incentives with different goals
is roughly tolerable.
A similar DAMT candidate stems from Tarasoff duties. 165 A majority of states require a
therapist to warn others or the authorities if the therapist believes that his or her patient is likely
to attack somebody. 166 On the don’t ask side, state law might functionally deter potential victims
from asking therapists about what their patients are saying in therapy—to the extent that
potential victims wonder about such tort law implications. Perhaps the questioner could be sued
for inducing breach of confidentiality duties, 167 which might yield a defensible balance of
pressures on therapists to respect patient confidences in nearly all situations. That said, we know
of no actual case dealing with questions from people fearful of assault. In fact, an element of the
inducement claim in Massachusetts is that “defendant did not reasonably believe that the
physician could disclose that information to the defendant without violating the duty of
confidentiality.” 168 This seems hard to establish where a person who honestly fears physical
attack by a patient asks a therapist about the risk. 169 Logically, there can be no inducement
liability for asking about a threat that a therapist must or even may disclose to you. Any residual

child); Rebecca Bennett et al., Ignorance is Bliss? HIV and Moral Duties and Legal Duties to Forewarn, 26 J. MED.
ETHICS 9 (2000); Timothy J. Hasken, Note, A Duty to Kiss and Tell?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 985, 987-92 (2010)
(discussing case law on duty to warn about infectious diseases, especially STDs).
165
See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976), superseded by statute CAL. CIV.
CODE § 43.92.
166
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Protect/Warn (Jan.
2013), available at <http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx> (visited
August 13, 2014). Seventeen states have rules permitting therapists to warn third parties of such dangers. Id. We
would characterize these jurisdictions as Don’t Ask, May Tell.
167
See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Mass. 1985) (recognizing an inducement claim even
without threats or promises of reward, where a minister’s superiors asked his psychiatrist about his mental health).
168
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
169
Cf. id. at 119 n.4 (explaining that “[d]isclosure is permitted only to meet a serious danger to the patient
or to others”); Valente v. Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, 2010 WL 5239186, at *2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Dec. 16,
2010) (stressing that the defendant sought information to defend against a lawsuit, not cash in on new clients).
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DAMT combination is more like another side-effect of unavoidable incentives than a plan by
judges or legislatures, whatever the merits of the resulting rules. 170
Why might DAMT be familiar in personal relationships but nearly unknown to formal
law? Setting aside workplace hazards and Tarasoff duties, which involve odd confluences of
different regulatory goals, perhaps formalizing DAMT tends to thwart its more typical trustbased objective. Even people in intimate personal relationships do not necessarily announce
DAMT as their rule. It strikes us as unlikely that many spouses, couples, or friends announce to
each other that they will not ask about certain transgressions but promise to tell about them if
they happen. Announcing the norms easily could communicate a troubling obtuseness about the
key attributes of such personal relationships. Similarly, DAMT laws could undermine the trust or
reciprocity on which the underlying relationship depends. True, law conceivably can be
understood as a distant third-party’s announcement that, if people decide to enter into a particular
relationship, then DAMT is a norm that might be enforced by others. But perhaps even thirdparty announcements are excessively formal. In addition, maybe the relationships in need of
DAMT depend on a thoroughgoing voluntariness that is crowded out by a legal norm—even if
the must-tell part of the combination is difficult for couples to enforce on their own. If the parties
to a relationship think that law is part of the reason for following DAMT, the relationship might
be poisoned by the confounding third-party pressures. There is no gift if law orders a person to
give. Nor is reciprocity likely to be induced if the trust generated is not sourced in that person’s
emotional commitment, but instead in third-party pressure. 171 We might say that love comes
from the heart, not the courts. Court is where divorce happens. 172
C. Must Ask, Must Tell (MAMT)
Like its polar-opposite, MAMT introduces a good measure of redundancy into the law.
DADT regards the disclosure of information as a vice, and MAMT wrings its hands over the
possibility of non-disclosure. This concern helps explain why restricted markets, such as guns or
alcohol and tobacco, are often governed by a MAMT regime at the point of sale. 173 This legal
170

Another offbeat illustration might come from Massachusetts, where the confluence of two insurance
regulations apparently generated a DAMT combination in 2011. The legislature prohibited insurers, including life
insurers, from asking applicants about genetic tests. On the other hand, actuarially sound genetic tests were supposed
to be disclosed by applicants for life insurance. As far as we know, this combination was not a conscious policy
choice. See Turna Ray, Genetic Bill of Rights in Mass. Seeks to Extend Protections in Life, Auto, Long-Term Care
Insurance, PHARMACOGENOMICS RPTR., Feb. 16, 2011.
171
See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71,
76-77 (2003).
172
One last possibility for DAMT in legal institutions involves government employment. High-level
officials might want to select for trustworthy employees who will confess wrongdoing without the trouble of
interrogation, which can threaten trust. We can imagine an intelligence agency attempting to operate this way, to the
extent that tying the hands of interrogators is especially valuable in attracting and retaining motivated operatives
while wrongdoing might be detected anyway using ask-C options. Unfortunately, we have not confirmed such an
arrangement, which needs an effective selection mechanism, and must ask or may ask norms could easily be better
for high-level officials. We thank John Ferejohn for proposing this possibility.
173
See supra text accompanying notes 89 & 98. On firearms sales, see Abramski v. United States, 134 S.Ct.
2259, 2263-64 (2014) (noting required submission of data to the National Instant Background Check System). On
cigarettes, see 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(b) (requiring that cigarette retailers verify by photo I.D. that purchasers are at
least age eighteen, unless the purchaser is actually over twenty six). On alcohol, see, for example, 235 ILL.
COMPILED STAT. 5/6-20 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-23 (West 2011). Even when state law does not
require alcohol retailers to check I.D.s, retailers often do so to minimize the risk of legal penalty for violating the
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regime applies to countless transactions every day. Of course it is true that many people violate
these laws for personal satisfaction and economic gain. In some locations, perhaps standard
operating procedure is to flout such laws. But imperfect enforcement does not undercut the
straightforward policy defense of MAMT in these settings. Here law tries to push both askers
and tellers in the same direction, toward the revelation and use of certain information. That
individual preferences and even social norms might conflict with a legal mandate can indicate
the need for law to serve societal or third-party interests. Access to addictive drugs and
dangerous weapons might fit this profile, whatever policy debates people have at the margins.
Another MAMT law affecting millions of people involves the I-9 form to verify eligibility to
work in the United States. 174 Again the law here is only partially effective, and people can debate
the extent to which immigration law should protect certain labor-market participants from
competition with outsiders who employers would otherwise happily hire. But taking this part of
immigration law as given, MAMT is no surprise and can be readily defended in light of contrary
market incentives.
Yet MAMT’s redundancy may be surprising in other contexts. As we shall see, MAMT
sometimes is employed where the asking party either already has the pertinent information or can
obtain it from a third party, and where there are reasons to be skeptical about the telling party’s
incentives to answer the questions forthrightly.
1. Background checks
In 2011, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of subjecting longtime
workers at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to compulsory background checks. 175 JPL
employees who refused to comply would face losing their jobs. 176 As part of the background
check, the landlords of JPL’s workers would be required to fill out Form 42—an Investigative
Request for Personal Information. 177 Form 42 digs into a landlord’s assessment of a present or
former tenant’s character. As the Court described the document:
After several preliminary questions about the extent of the reference’s
associations with the employee, the form asks if the reference has “any reason to
question” the employee’s “honesty or trustworthiness.” It also asks if the
reference knows of any “adverse information” concerning the employee’s
“violations of the law,” “financial integrity,” “abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,”
must-use rule. See N.Y. STATE LIQUOR AUTH., HANDBOOK FOR RETAIL LICENSEES 20-21 (2013) (warning retailers
about undercover agents and “strongly recommend[ing]” card checks, but acknowledging that state law does not
require them). Indeed, even those who come up with plausible-sounding excuses for failing to ask for identification
from those seeking access to alcohol are likely to receive an unsympathetic hearing in court. See, e.g., LubavitchChabad of Illinois, Inc. v. Northwestern Univ., 772 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting discrimination argument
by an Orthodox rabbi who insisted that demanding identification from students before serving them wine on Jewish
holidays would violate the tenets of his religion).
174
See 10E FED. PROC. FORMS § 40:807 (2014); http://www.uscis.gov/i-9.
175
See National Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
176
See id. at 761.
177
Form 42 initially “ask[s]” respondents to “complete all items on the back of this form,” but the fine print
of the form suggests that respondents are “required to respond” to a Form 42 that contains a valid OBM number. See
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, INV Form 42 (Rev. 6/05), available at
<http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201002-3206-002&icID=33638> (visited July 24, 2014).
The Office estimates that 1,636,379 Form 42’s are sent out every year, resulting in 111,794 hours of paperwork
annually. See <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-29/html/2014-01874.htm> (visited July 24, 2014).
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“mental or emotional stability,” “general behavior or conduct,” or “other matters.”
If “yes” is checked for any of these categories, the form calls for an explanation in
the space below. That space is available for providing “additional information”
(“derogatory” or “favorable”) that may bear on “suitability for government
employment or a security clearance.” 178
The Ninth Circuit found the open-ended questions on Form 42 (“any reason to question?”)
particularly troubling. 179 That court ruled that the open-ended question was likely
unconstitutional, observing that Form 42 “invites the recipient to reveal any negative information
of which he or she is aware. It is difficult to see how the vague solicitation of derogatory
information concerning the applicant’s ‘general behavior or conduct’ could be narrowly tailored
to meet any legitimate need.” 180
The Supreme Court was unimpressed. The alternative to asking landlords whether they
knew anything negative about tenants that might affect their fitness for federal positions was to
produce a much longer form that would “catalog all the reasons why a person might not be
suitable for a particular job.” 181 That could be an obnoxious and time-consuming burden if the
landlords were conscientious about responding. “[R]eferences do not have all day.” 182
On the telling side, the government mandate here addresses two kinds of respondents
who may prefer to remain silent without special legal pressure. The first type is positively
disposed towards the subject of the inquiry and would prefer not to disclose something that
might cause the subject to lose a job opportunity. But faced with even a remote prospect of a
penalty for failure to answer a question truthfully, the landlord will disclose adverse information
to the government. 183 The second type is negatively or neutrally disposed towards the subject
and would prefer to disclose the adverse information to the government in the abstract, but fears
defamation or other liability if the applicant finds out that the landlord contributed to the
applicant losing a job opportunity. Compulsion should prompt the risk-averse landlord to
respond, and the compulsory nature of the landlord’s response could make a court considering a
subsequent defamation suit less sympathetic to the plaintiff. 184 In both instances, Must Tell likely
produces more pertinent information than May Tell. Moreover, the nature of the government’s
form alerts landlords to a must-tell obligation about which they might otherwise be unaware.
2. Taxes
The personal income tax regime is perhaps the most familiar MAMT regime to many
Americans. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides each taxpayer with a form (typically
178

Id.
Nelson v. National Aeronautics & Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 881 (9th Cir. 2008).
180
Id.
181
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 761.
182
Id.
183
With respect to this sort of landlord, Form 42’s open ended questions are in one sense less effective than
the alternative of a great many very specific questions. A landlord who knows something troublesome about a tenant
that isn’t explicitly addressed on form 42 (say, the job seeker is an extremely careless driver or an atrocious writer)
is unlikely to be penalized in the face of ambiguity over whether a particular fact provides “any reason to question”
an applicant’s fitness for a job.
184
Cf. Noyes v. Moccia, 1999 WL 814376, at *9 (D.N.H. June 24, 1999) (“In addition, Defendant Moccia’s
allegedly defamatory statements were not unsolicited, but were made in response to the USPS’s approved request
for information.”).
179

– 35 –

January 16, 2015 Draft

1040 or 1040-EZ) containing a long list of questions that the taxpayer must answer truthfully,
under penalty of perjury. 185 Each taxpayer must answer the same basic questions, though
taxpayers with substantial investment incomes, foreign earnings, or unusual credits and
deductions may need to fill out supplemental forms and schedules.
Strikingly, because it collects tax information from third parties like employers, banks,
and brokerages, IRS already has much of the most important information that a taxpayer will
provide on the applicable 1040. This redundancy has sparked reformers to call for replacement
of the current, high-transaction costs MAMT regime with one where the government
automatically calculates each taxpayer’s liability (or refund) each year and sends her a bill (or
check). 186 Notwithstanding the substantial time savings for taxpayers that such plans may
entail, 187 these proposals for reform have not been implemented. What gives?
Our first answer is that the government might impose “Must Ask” on itself to guard
against an agency problem. The poorly incentivized government official performing a
background check might be tempted to cut corners, and Forms 42 and SF-85 limit the agent’s
ability to carelessly wing it. Similarly, Form 1040 effectively forces the government’s agents to
ask questions about taxable events that occur quite irregularly but that, in the aggregate, may
make a meaningful contribution to tax revenues. Once government decides to ask for
information, “Must Tell” can facilitate automated authentication. MAMT may be useful in
flagging for further review mismatches between the responses given and the responses expected.
Similarly, discrepancies between tax information reported by employers and information
reported by employees can be noticed algorithmically. 188 In a world where the IRS has limited
resources, focusing on these discrepancies is a sensible strategy to detect mistakes and cheating.
Less obviously, when the government requests personal information from individuals,
rather than obtaining the same information from third parties, it can prompt self examination by
the individual. Perhaps a world without mandatory background checks is one in which too many
applicants fail to self-screen, by not asking themselves the hard questions about whether they can
be trusted with state secrets. Maybe for every Edward Snowden 189 there are dozens of unknown
federal job applicants who realize upon answering background check questions that they ought
not be trusted with a public sector position and withdraw from consideration. Similarly, we
expect that some taxpayers who prepare their own returns are surprised in April when in
response to a governmental query they write down particular numbers on their 1040 forms.
Somewhat dated studies of income tax awareness indicate that Americans surveyed a few
months after filing their taxes were typically 14–19% off in estimating the taxes they recently

185

See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1206 (D. Utah 2012).
See Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 773 (2008)
(proposing tax data retrieval from IRS and optional automatic tax returns); see also Randall Stross, Why Can’t the
I.R.S. Help Fill in the Blanks?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010.
187
At the turn of the millennium, 125.9 million American individual income taxpayers devoted an
estimated 3.21 billion hours to complying with the income tax. See John L. Guyton et al., Estimating the
Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 673, 682 (2003).
188
See Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 503, 558 (2011).
189
Keep in mind that there is only one Edward Snowden. Or maybe two, if you consider Bradley Manning
to be another Edward Snowden.
186
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paid, 190 with a slight tendency to underestimate their tax bills. 191 If people are bad at estimating
their tax liability when they have already calculated their taxes, they might be particularly inept
at assessing such liability if they had never calculated their taxes. Insofar as Americans do the
work of calculating their own income and taxes due, it might make them more aware of the
burdens of citizenship, better informed voters, or even feel a sense of civic duty that alters their
perception of the burden. 192 People may also be imperfect at assessing their own income, 193 so
discerning their Adjusted Gross Incomes every year may prompt individual taxpayers to take
actions that better reflect their values (e.g., “I should donate more to charity” or “I need to get
out of this dead-end job” or “Why didn’t I save more money this year?”).
The above are public-spirited justifications for MAMT. But, as with DADT and DAMT,
there are more troubling explanations for this combination. With respect to income tax filing,
supporters of small government might believe that “the process is the punishment,” to borrow a
phrase. Filling out a 1040 is, for millions of people, worse than a waste of time. It is an occasion
for frustration and even outrage at the federal government’s greed. Advocates who want a nightwatchman-style small state might believe that individuals will not feel such frustration and
outrage if the government lightens the paperwork burden. Tax preparers form an important
interest group too, and they may resist efforts to streamline the government’s questioning.
D. Must Ask, Don’t Tell (MADT)
“If any of you can show just cause why they may not lawfully be married, speak now; or
else for ever hold your peace” is a request that has been made at countless traditional Christian
wedding ceremonies for generations. 194 Although the quoted language might be rarely employed
these days, it still figures prominently in films, with directors apparently unable to resist the
ostensibly hilarious contrast between what the guests or filmgoers are thinking (skeletons in the
closet, a doomed relationship) and external appearances (a match made in heaven, till death do
they part). Or sometimes the guests in the film do not hold their peace, and a doomed nuptial is
avoided. 195 Audiences respond well to these scenes because they know that, in fact, it would be
deeply inappropriate to voice objections at somebody else’s wedding regardless of the literal
meaning of a minister’s invitation. The social norm against telling at these ceremonies, in front
190

See Norbert Lloyd Enrick, A Pilot Study of Income Tax Consciousness, 16 NAT’L TAX J. 169, 170

(1963).
191

See id. A more recent literature review on tax perceptions is Martin Fochmann et al., Tax Perception: An
Empirical Survey, ARQUS-DISKUSSIONBEITRÄGE ZUR QUANTITATIVEN STEUERLEHRE, No. 99 (2010).
192
Some of these arguments are considered in LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040
(2013).
193
See generally Marcel Das & Arthur van Soest, Expected and Realized Income Changes: Evidence from
the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, 32 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 137, 146-51 (1997) (suggesting that demographic
groups of Dutch respondents varied in their tendencies to overestimate or underestimate their current year income,
but that underestimation was more common in total).
194
THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 424 (Gregory M. Howe ed., Church
Publishing Incorporated 2007) (1549),
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/sites/default/files/downloads/book_of_common_prayer.pdf (visited August 25,
2014).
195
The Graduate is the most famous movie scene of this sort. Other depictions include Four Weddings and
a Funeral and Made of Honor (earnestly following the formula) and Wayne’s World 2, The Lonely Guy, Harold &
Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay, and What About Bob?? (parodying the Graduate formula). For a
comprehensive listing, see http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SpeakNowOrForeverHoldYourPeace.
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of everybody assembled, is strong enough to make one doubt that the ceremonial words should
be understood as anything like an honest request for information. The entrenched MADT norm
functions in a manner somewhat similar to a penalty default; 196 it incentivizes those with
material information to bring it to the bride and groom’s attention long before the wedding day.
Either way, there are recurring situations in which some people feel encouraged to ask while
other people are discouraged from answering.
1. Meet the Press and Codes of Silence
Whereas the wedding version of MADT promotes answering the key question earlier, its
journalistic equivalent underscores the desirability of answering later. When politicians who are
thinking of running for President appear for interviews on news programs, viewers are again
subjected to an odd form of MADT. The interviewer inevitably asks the politician whether he or
she will run, and the prospective candidate usually offers a coy non-response. 197 Journalists may
even preface this line of questioning in a manner that underscores its obligatory nature, as when
John Patterson said to Senator Obama, “I’m pretty sure I know the answer, but I have to ask,
because everyone has to ask this question now: Are you flat out ruling out a run in 2008?”198 The
goal of journalists here seems to be creating artificial drama. 199 The question is usually asked at a
time when declaring one’s candidacy is politically inopportune. It is not as though candidates
who have decided to run for a higher office ever forget to announce their candidacy.
Sometimes, however, the candidate actually says that they are indeed running, jolting
viewers who were expecting to encounter the Sunday morning punditry’s peculiar form of
kabuki. But this tends to occur with severe underdogs, especially those who have run and lost
before. 200 For these candidates, a Q&A session on a national television program is about as much
attention as they are ever going to get. As a result, the candidate who actually announces his
candidacy for the Presidency on Good Morning America or Meet the Press, is likely to be giving
a concession speech on the night of the New Hampshire primaries.

196
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 91 (1989).
197
See, e.g., Meet the Press Transcript, Feb. 18, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 3242832 (Chuck Hagel
refusing to answer Tim Russert’s questions about whether he will seek the Republican nomination for President in
2008); Meet the Press Transcript, Feb. 11, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2723485 (recounting various exchanges
between Tim Russert and Barack Obama about whether the latter would run for President, with initially definitive
answers being replaced by non-responses as the presidential primaries drew nearer); ABC News Special Report
Transcript, Dec. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 24493409 (Sarah Palin refusing to answer Barbara Walter’s
question about whether she will seek the Presidency in 2012). This routine is a specific example of a more general
relationship between politicians and the professional news media, part of which involves apparently adversarial
Q&A.
198
John Patterson, What’s Changed for Obama in Last 2 Years, CHI. DAILY HERALD, July 27, 2006, at 7,
available at 2006 WL 24379014. To this query, the future President responded, “I was asked the day after the
election to the Senate, when I was running for president. I said at that time I was not running for president. Nothing
has changed my mind.” Id.
199
Judicial confirmation hearings in the Senate sometimes follow the same formula, with Senators asking
questions they know the nominees will not answer about how the nominees would rule in particular cases.
200
See, e.g., Good Morning America Transcript, May 13, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 9594998 (in
which Ron Paul responds to George Stephanopoulos that he will in fact seek the Presidency in 2012); Meet the Press
Transcript, February 24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 3637693 (in which Ralph Nader responds to Tim Russert
that he will be running for President again).
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As these twin examples suggest, Must Ask, Don’t Tell is a strange combination that we
should not expect or want in many locations. MADT suggests a malfunction in our social
systems, in which a group of questioners are obligated to demand information that a group of
respondents are obligated to withhold. A number of interactive situations produce MADT
combinations that are more or less tragic, even if fairly stable over time. Think about codes of
silence among police officers who are committed to impeding misconduct investigations by
internal affairs and others up the chain of command. 201 And think about “don’t snitch”
campaigns among those in the game of organized crime, as well as ordinary citizens who are
committed to impeding criminal investigations by police officers. 202 In these settings of outright
conflict, competing subgroups have developed competing sets of norms. To see the MADT
combination, an observer must open her frame of reference to aggregate two different lines of
social, moral, and legal authorities. Code of silence of situations are not far from spy versus spy
international intrigue, which is unavoidable to a degree but hardly comforting. Nor are they
terribly far from the relationship between investigative journalists seeking classified information
and government officials sometimes resisting and sometimes disclosing.
As we have seen, U.S. law does not often embrace Don’t Ask, Must Tell, either. But in
that case, our best explanation involves law’s difficulty in building the delicate trust relationships
on which DAMT is often based. With MADT, law might be all too effective in signaling the
absence of trust and the acceptability of open conflict. Of course, any market economy of
significant scale will encompass significant differences in values, worldviews, and strategies.
Some conflict and competition is unavoidable, and they can be a source of growth and
innovation if regulated intelligently. This does not mean law ought to loudly endorse questions
calling for information that should not be disclosed, but it does suggest that law and social norms
will tolerate MADT in some situations. So we might look for MADT combinations where
adversarial relationships are tolerated and where asymmetries in information and wit are
accepted. Which brings us to lawyering.
2. Civil Discovery
Discovery in the United States sometimes entails voluminous requests for information
and voluminous responses to those requests. In complex cases, where millions of (electronic)
documents might change hands, lawyers frequently make mistakes, improperly producing
attorney work product or privileged communications when those documents should have been
withheld in accord with the client’s interest. In some jurisdictions it is fair to characterize law’s
attitude toward the civil discovery of privileged documents in high-stakes cases as MADT. 203
Not all discovery rules have this character, obviously. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)
creates a limited norm of “must tell even if not asked”: parties are supposed to disclose
automatically to each other certain information that is helpful, not harmful, to the disclosing

201

See Jerome Skolnick, Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 7 (2002).
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING 121-38 (2009) (asserting that don’t-snitch norms originated
with people actively involved in the drug trade and became a complaint from citizens and affected neighborhoods
who objected to informants staying on the streets, but acknowledging more widespread campaigns).
203
See Paula Schaefer, Technology’s Triple Threat to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2013 J. PROFESSIONAL
LAW. 171, 178-80 (2013). In run-of-the-mill, lower stakes cases handled by solo practitioners and small firms, “may
ask, don’t tell” and “may ask, may tell” are more likely to prevail.
202

– 39 –

January 16, 2015 Draft

party’s case. 204 More important, judicial personnel help manage civil discovery under a general
rule that parties must answer each other’s relevant questions. The discovery rules are, however,
adversarial in key respects. Along with rules of professional responsibility and lawyers’
economic incentives, if not the social-sanctioned backed norms of our profession, the civil
discovery system often encourages adversarial MAMT behavior. 205
From the perspective of the lawyer seeking discovery in a high-stakes case, “Must Ask”
is the order of the day. As an agent of the client, 206 the attorney is ethically obligated to seek
relevant documents that may help the client construct a case or learn information relevant to the
causes of action, defenses, and damages at issue. 207 Lawyers are not charged with taking any
measures to limit the scope of discovery in a manner that will reduce the risk of privileged
documents improperly changing hands. 208 Rather, the responsibility for preventing leaks of
privileged information is squarely on the shoulders of opposing counsel. Thus, from the
perspective of the lawyer responding to a discovery request, “Don’t Tell” is the imperative for
privileged information and attorney work-product—unless the interests of their principal would
be served by disclosure, of course, in which case the lawyer-agent should recommend not
invoking it. Crudely speaking, each side fights for its own interest.
Of course lawyers do not always fulfill these roles. Interestingly, legal authorities deviate
with respect to what ought to happen when a lawyer seeking discovery asks, opposing counsel
improperly tells, and documents that should have been part of a privilege log instead find their
way into the hands of opposing counsel. Under ABA Model Rule 4.4(b), an attorney who
receives information that the attorney knows or reasonably should know to be privileged or work
product has a duty to inform the disclosing party of this fact. 209 The improperly disclosing party
may then seek a remedy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), which may require
the return or destruction of inadvertently disclosed privileged or work product information. 210
But disagreement and ambiguity abound. Rule 4.4(b) has not been adopted by some
jurisdictions. 211 Even where it applies, determining whether information was inadvertently sent
may be a judgment call, one made by the receiving attorney against the background of her duty
204

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (referring to certain items that a party “may use to support its
claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment”); see also id. 26(e)(1) (requiring updates). The
rule is useless insofar as parties already have incentives to disclose helpful evidence to impress their adversaries and
obtain a favorable settlement.
205
Another partial exception is the duty to consider cost to the other side when formulating discovery
requests. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii); see also Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 334-38
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (collecting cases imposing cost sharing on requesting parties).
206
See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 40-48, 76 (1989)
(explaining competing conceptions of the proper lawyer role, though concluding that the officer-of-the-court
conception is a small part of the enforced norms of professional conduct).
207
See LEGAL ETHICS, LAW. DESKBK. PROF. RESP. § 1.2-3 (2013-2014 ed.).
208
Lawyers might limit the scope of their discovery questions so as to mitigate the fees they will have to
charge clients for reviewing the documents produced, or to comply with their Rule 26(g) duties. Privileged
documents from the other side, though, are likely to be juicy enough so that it will almost inevitably be worth the
client’s time to review them once they have been produced.
209
“Must Ask, Don’t Tell, Must Tell”! The resulting 27-box matrix appears in an appendix. (Not really.)
210
For a helpful discussion, see Nathan M. Crystal, Inadvertent Production of Privileged Information in
Discovery in Federal Court: The Need for Well-Drafted Clawback Agreements, 64 S.C. L. REV. 581, 600-04 (2013).
211
See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional
Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 206-07 (2010).
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to help her client. 212 There is then the related issue of whether the privilege has been waived for
purposes of trial, and the federal rule is about equally gauzy. In federal proceedings, the
improper disclosure of attorney-client privileged communications or work product does not
constitute a waiver if “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took
reasonable steps to rectify the error.” 213 Under this approach, the sloppy or passive lawyer who
has unwittingly supplied his adversary with privileged communications has lost the privilege for
his client and is potentially liable for malpractice, but the test for any of these elements is far
from self-executing.
Working in combination, then, the rules provide cause for parties to include privileged
and work product information within the ambit of their discovery requests. At minimum the rules
offer no reason to take care that the other side’s privileged material stays secret. While most
responding parties will invoke the privilege, some will fail to do so as a result of bad legal
judgment or improper protocols, and this possibility is a pay-off for inclusive discovery requests
that offer no friendly reminders about privilege risks. 214 There is always hope that a key
privileged communication will slip through and be available as evidence at trial, thereby
favorably changing the settlement dynamics. To be sure, some parties have tried to mitigate the
risks of these sorts of mistakes through clawback agreements entered into at the beginning of
discovery, but even these clawback agreements often given rise to thorny new legal disputes. 215
We might wonder why law imposes minor burdens on the party seeking discovery only at
the time it receives a document that it knows or should know to be privileged. Why not impose
obligations on parties seeking discovery to frame their requests for documents to mitigate the
risk of an inadvertent disclosure? A good initial response rests on information asymmetries: The
party responding to discovery is the only party that sees all the pertinent documents, and so is in
the best position to prevent these errors. At the time its discovery requests are formulated, the
asking party is essentially flying blind. That said, while the lawyer producing the discovery is
almost always going to be the cheapest-cost avoider, it does not necessarily follow that all of the
burdens of avoiding the accident ought to fall on her. Beyond that, the failure of the states to
coalesce around a unified solution to this costly problem reflects a clash of conflicting values.
States want to clamp down on a kind of litigation gamesmanship that raises costs and contributes
to acrimony, but at the end of the day judges also prefer having access to information that
promotes accurate factfinding, and they may benefit from the existence of doctrines that penalize
careless lawyering too.

212

See id. at 603; see also Schaefer, supra note 203, at 179-80 (asserting that, even in states with a
notification duty, there are “numerous cases in which the sending attorney first learned of the disclosure not through
notice from opposing counsel, but at a deposition where the mistake was revealed for the first time”; and that
receiving attorneys might think that disclosure can be so terribly careless as to be beyond “inadvertence”).
213
FED. R. EVID. 502(b). Not all states follow the federal approach in state court litigation. See Leroy J.
Tornquist & Christine R. Olson, Why Oregon Should Adopt an Equivalent to Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 46
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 565-68 (2010).
214
Contrast the footer on every email you receive from any lawyer on any topic, plus the long list of
consumer protection disclosure requirements. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW (2014).
215
For discussion, see Crystal, supra note 210, at 603-23.
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E. Partially Permissive Rules
As we noted in Part I.B.1 (May Ask, May Tell), purely permissive norms often fit the
intuition that the individuals with questions and answers have a better sense of the trade-offs
involved than government or the community. On the other hand, Part II.A (Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell) and Part II.C (Must Ask, Must Tell) offered reasons for Q&A rules to point in the same
direction sometimes, either inhibiting or encouraging information flows beyond what
unregulated parties might produce on their own. The least intuitive combinations discussed in
Part II.B (Don’t Ask, Must Tell) and Part II.D (Must Ask, Don’t Tell) also occupy interesting
locations in our legal and social life, but those spaces are sometimes small, sometimes difficult to
defend, and sometimes unstable. This leaves one last set of combinations that deserves comment:
“partially permissive rules.”
Q&A rules sometimes show a targeted regulatory interest, combining a one-sided
permissive rule with a must or don’t rule. As Figure 1 illustrated, each form of partially
permissive rule exists in American law and society. The minor puzzle is why legal and social
norms would not tilt all the way toward preventing or requiring both asking and telling, when
total permissiveness is denied. Our analysis above suggests explanations in these spaces, too:
Permissive norms often show confidence in the judgment of a questioner or respondent, but such
confidence need not extend to every party involved. Partially permissive rules might be defended
based on asymmetric regulatory risks and opportunities. 216 Here we will simplify the analysis of
this complicated subject by focusing on legal rules and plausible explanations.
“Don’t Ask, May Tell” examples often are linked to one-sided worries about the
vulnerability of respondents to questioner power. Suspect B might have a right to remain silent in
a custodial environment free from prying questions from officer A, but B need not continue to
exercise that right. As well, employers cannot lawfully ask employees whether they support
unionization; the query is perceived as one likely to intimidate workers. 217 Yet preventing
employees from expressing union preferences would impede unionization deliberations by
inhibiting worker-to-employer communication and worker-to-worker persuasion. Similar
judgments probably are at work when antidiscrimination law regulates employer questions about
religion, disability, criminal history, or other traits without regulating employee disclosures about
those traits. 218 Such one-sided regulation will sometimes misfire via unraveling, as we have
discussed, 219 or via statistical discrimination. 220
216

This thought can be connected to regulated markets more generally, as Daryl Levinson has helpfully
suggested to us. Sometimes participants in the same market for goods and services are regulated differently with
respect to related behavior. Rules of professional responsibility might prohibit lawyers from chasing ambulances,
but injured people are free to chase lawyers. The cheapest cost avoider might effectively shoulder greater
responsibility to prevent injuries than other people with whom she interacts, and not only by issuing warnings. Some
of our commentary here might generalize, and lessons might be drawn from other markets. Given our focus in this
Article, however, we leave those extensions to another day.
217
See Venture Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Union, 330 N.L.R.B. 1133, 1138 (2000).
218
See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment
Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893 (2014).
219
See supra Part II.A.2.
220
See, e.g., LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 142-46 (2011); Sonja B. Starr, Do
Ban the Box Laws Reduce Employment Barriers for Black Men? available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2470395> (unpublished April 2014 draft, noting preliminary
findings).
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“May Ask, Must Tell” also can arise from one-sided worries about power—this time the
power of potential respondents. Sometimes a tip-off is the duty to tell being conditioned on
getting a question. Under FOIA, person A gets to decide whether to be interested in certain
government operations, while government agency B has a legal obligation to respond with
certain categories of records upon request. 221 We can think of government as an agent of the
people to account for the may and the must norms. Furthermore, the people’s diverse interests
are not readily known before questions are posed, which also helps explain why telling is
conditioned on asking. 222 Mandatory reporting statutes for suspected child abuse represent a
distinct concern, by the way. Teachers, clergy, health care professionals, and child advocates
have legal obligations to report suspected abuse to the state, 223 but the state generally does not
ask mandatory reporters whether they have learned of any suspected abuse. 224 Perhaps we can
trust the state to assess whether such queries require too much paperwork or will prompt
mandatory reporters to hound children with questions, which could damage trust relationships
between mandatory reporters and children. 225
Other combinations may reflect concerns about asymmetric information and
administrative convenience, yielding regulation of A or B but not both. “May Ask, Don’t Tell”
pops up when home buyers are permitted to ask their real estate agents about the racial
composition of a neighborhood, but the Fair Housing Act’s anti-steering rules at least arguably
prohibit the real estate agent from answering such a question. 226 Somewhat similarly, home
buyers are permitted to tell real estate agents about their desire to be proximate to a particular
221

See supra note 68.
Revealingly, the government’s duty to tell extends only to existing records otherwise within the scope of
the statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975); Samaha,
supra note 69, at 971-72 (highlighting limits on FOIA). There is no generally applicable statutory obligation to
respond to questions that agency employees could answer with ease, let alone to use the kind of records covered by
FOIA. The statute is a compromise, not a full implementation of a principal-agent model.
223
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.623 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (West 2014); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2013). In each instance, the
mandated reporter’s duty is limited to reporting based on reasonable cause, and not extended to a duty to investigate.
See also ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., MANUAL FOR MANDATED REPORTERS (2014),
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/docs/CFS_1050-21_Mandated_Reporter_Manual.pdf.
224
The statutory frameworks establishing mandatory reporting regimes generally contain no provisions
requiring law enforcement officers to survey those subject to mandatory reporting requirements about whether they
have any information that would give rise to a duty to report. Governmental duties under such statutes are typically
limited to training mandatory reporters about their legal investigations and properly investigating an allegation once
it is brought to the state’s attention. See, e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1164 et seq. & § 11174.1(c).
225
Compare our discussion in Part II.A.1 of the harm that suspicious questions about infidelity can do to a
romantic relationship.
226
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2009). Compare Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 n.11 (E.D. Mich.
1975) (suggesting in dicta that responding to such questions is unlawful), aff’d 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977), with
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530-31 (7th Cir. 1990) (suggesting in dicta that responding to
such questions is lawful if the conversation is initiated by the client). For the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s application of § 3604(a) to racial steering, see 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a). The legal issue remains highly
controversial, see Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete
Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1643-46 (2007), but real estate agents’ practice is
evidently to resist answering such questions based on concerns about legal liability. See Teke Wiggin, Steering 2.0?
Data May Undermine Fair Housing Laws, INMAN SELECT, April 29, 2014, available at
<www.inman.com/2014/04/29/steering-2-0-data-may-undermine-fair-housing-laws/> (visited Dec. 26, 2014).
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faith’s church or temple, but real estate agents should not broach the issue. 227 Here the law, on
one reading, seeks to undermine voluntary racial and religious segregation by inhibiting
information flows, and regulating the conduct of real estate agents will be much cheaper and
more effective than regulating the conduct of unorganized and less-sophisticated customers.
Information asymmetries concerning a contractual nondisclosure obligation can also yield May
Ask, Don’t Tell. Here the questioner is ignorant about the would-be-teller’s contractual
obligation, so putting the responsibility for avoiding the disclosure on the shoulders of the party
that has assumed the obligation is both economically sensible and morally appealing.
Finally, partially permissive rules can have paternalistic justifications, when people
believe A or B should be made to help B or A. Thus May Ask, Don’t Tell norms can protect the
questioner from information he only thinks he wants to hear. Legal immunity can arise for
physicians who withhold information from patients for therapeutic reasons. 228 Social norms may
dictate diversionary tactics when friends ask each other whether a haircut is appealing or whether
an unreturnable outfit makes them look fat. Perhaps the aforementioned sexist norm against
asking an adult woman her age had a similar origin: women would be tempted to lie in response
to the question. 229
On the other hand, “Must Ask, May Tell” can encourage B to consider using information
that society values, and yet leave the ultimate decision to her. An example is police-offered
Miranda warnings coupled with a question about the arrestee’s understanding. 230 This is a nudge
from A that might highlight B’s options. Similarly, “May Ask, Must Tell” can be a strategy to
ensure that A receives information that she personally does not want. Here, telling duties will not
be conditioned on anyone asking. Several states have enacted laws to compel abortion providers
to disclose information 231 and, more recently, to display ultrasound images to women seeking
abortions. 232 While North Carolina requires the patient to sign a form indicating whether she
“has availed herself of the opportunity to view the image” of the fetus, 233 the act should not “be
construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or
from refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation and medical description.” 234 The law thus
shies away from a Clockwork Orange-style “May Ask, Must Tell, Must Listen” regime, though
227

See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a); 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Stewart A. Laidlaw et al., Genetic
Testing and Human Subjects in Research, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 462 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 945 n.184 (1994) (discussing a privilege for therapeutic nondisclosure in the
United Kingdom).
229
Concern for respondents was a rationale for prohibiting sworn trial testimony from criminal defendants
in early American history. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). Several reasons have been given, such as
the presumably low reliability of the information and avoiding temptation to perjury and sin. See Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2645
& n.77, 2661-62 (1996). Obviously this regime fell apart.
230
Whether informal pressures will lead a suspect to ignore or waive these rights is another important issue.
231
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1303(d) (regarding mandatory disclosures by doctors
about fetal heartbeat and the probability of carrying to term); see also Edwards v. Beck, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1101
(E.D. Ark. 2014) (upholding the Arkansas disclosure requirements).
232
See Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2392, 2415-21 (2014).
233
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90.21-85(a)(2)-(5).
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Id. § 90.21-85(b).
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it does require the abortion provider to display and describe the fetus’s anatomy even if the
patient is plugging her ears and wearing a blindfold. 235
Such must-tell duties result from an unusual combination of factors. A concern for third
party harms (to fetuses) is an obvious ground for defense. Indeed North Carolina legislators
presumably would prefer to prohibit most abortions but are barred by constitutional doctrine
from doing so. 236 Hence they arrive at their second-best solution of mandating disclosure of
information and images designed to dissuade women from obtaining abortions, which also might
be characterized as informed consent. At the same time, paternalistic explanations also play a
part. At minimum, the state wants the citizenry to reflect on the moral significance of their
decision. 237 More insidiously, the state might feel that women are particularly susceptible to
emotional manipulation, and that confronting an image of a fetus is particularly likely to pull at
the heart strings of women. 238 In any case, the Fourth Circuit recently invalidated the Must Tell
portion of North Carolina’s regime on First Amendment grounds, 239 moving the state toward
“May Ask, May Tell”—where we began.
III. THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS
By now, we hope that readers are convinced that legal and social norms in a complex
society with diverse relationships should generate every possible combination of asking and
telling norms, though some combinations will appear more frequently and last longer than
others, depending on the circumstances. In this Part, we provide more structure to our analysis by
suggesting further themes for the patterns we see. One basis for sorting Q&A norms is whether
or not they are meant to control subsequent use of the queried information. Sometimes use
concerns are the best explanation and justification for regulating Q&A, sometimes not. We then
show how current technological developments upset some of the traditional strategies for
regulating asking and telling. Though the world we have described so far has been mostly binary,
with A and B deciding whether to exchange information, we will suggest how the existence of
multiple repositories for information both complicates the analysis and offers new opportunities
for policymakers concerned about the quantum and quality of information flows.
A. Use Rules
In attempting to organize and rationalize a large number of examples, we might suggest a
number of themes. For instance, we have indicated that many norms for asking and telling are
defensible in terms of third (or second) party interests, and some on paternalistic concerns.
235

See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602-03 (M.D.N.C. 2014). The law permits abortion
providers to make blindfolds and noise-cancelling headphones available to patients who do not wish to hear the
physician’s disclosures, though it does not require that they do so. See id. at 590.
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See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (joint opinion) (endorsing an undue burden test).
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See id. at 605; Stuart v. Camnitz, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 7237744 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014), at *4 (“ The
state freely admits that the purpose and anticipated effect of the Display of Real-Time View Requirement is to
convince women seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess their decisions.”).
238
See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 351, 396-97 (2008) (suggesting this objective and that such an ultrasound requirement is “less an
appeal to reason than an attempt to overpower it”).
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See Stuart, 2014 WL 7237744, at *10-13. But see Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Services
v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577-80 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding similar regulations against a First Amendment
challenge).
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Likewise, we might try to understand combinations of Q&A rules by assuming optimistically
that social and legal norms tend to be efficient or welfare-maximizing. Alternatively, one could
assume that social and legal norms cater to the interests of the powerful and the mainstream.
Each of these ideas is useful in developing provisional positive and normative theories for any
legal or social rule, including those governing the pushing and pulling of information. A more
targeted principle for sorting our examples involves the relationship between information
disclosure and information use. This relationship might prove critical to understanding which
combination of Q&A norms is plausibly best and perhaps why a legal and social system adopts
particular norms.
Two of our extreme asking-and-telling combinations are readily defended by use
concerns, even if in part. DADT becomes a plausible combination of silencing norms when the
goal is to prevent the information in question from influencing decisions. Employment
discrimination laws in conjunction with various social norms reinforce commitments to prevent
adverse decisions based on protected traits; and the U.S. military’s abandoned and severely
compromised DADT policy was an indication that policy makers had not coalesced around a
don’t use norm. By the same token, MAMT becomes plausible when the goal is instead to ensure
that decisions are based on the information in question. The most common examples involve
restricted products and labor markets, in which economic incentives would produce more deals
than policymakers will tolerate; and we analyzed interesting illustrations involving background
checks and income taxes. One might be tempted to generalize that any combination involving a
“Must” or “Don’t” indicates concern about information use.
Many more justifications for regulating Q&A are apparent in our analysis, however, to
say nothing of the constellation of forces responsible for establishing these norms as a positive
matter. Go no further than personal and contractual duties of confidentiality. The resulting don’ttell obligations may not have anything to do with norms against others using the confidential
information, as opposed to encouraging reliance on agreements and generating safe spaces for
honest discussion, for instance. So, too, for don’t-ask rules. Most people do not want law
enforcement to use every available technology and interrogation technique to identify lawbreaking, but this position on police inquiries does not suggest that the incriminating information
itself should be off-limits in a criminal trial if gathered in an acceptable manner. Questions can
be perfectly appropriate in terms of subject matter yet objectionably overbearing or coercive,
whether in police custody or employment settings. Gentle questioning might even be a way of
ensuring reliable answers. In addition, we have observed that direct questions can threaten trust
relationships or simply hurt feelings, regardless of whether the information should be used in a
subsequent decision. Recall our discussions of child abuse reporting 240 and Tarasoff duties, 241 for
example. Moreover, norms governing asking or telling come with a variety of costs, including
information losses and possible information overloads. No one can hope to deploy a single
variable, use or otherwise, to fully explain or justify the range of combinations that we have
examined.
In this spirit of subtlety, return now to our other two corner combinations: use norms are
not persuasive explanations or defenses for either DAMT or MADT. MADT in the form of a
code of silence is the product of warring authorities, essentially ruling out the possibility of a
unified use norm to explain or justify the combination. Civil discovery clashes similarly result
240
241

See supra text accompanying note 223.
See supra text accompanying note 165.
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from competing obligations to competing principals, and suggest basically nothing about what
the finders of fact should do with the underlying information. As for DAMT, conventional norms
for infidelity reflect a nuanced view that, while adultery is unethical or immoral for the couple,
questioning the loyalty of one’s spouse without hard proof is also problematic. After a spouse
learns of a partner’s infidelity, acting on this information (including judging the partner harshly,
demanding honest apologies, separating, and filing for divorce) is appropriate according to
mainstream values. One cannot easily derive the use rule from the asking and telling rules, which
point in opposite directions. On the one hand, the current shift toward finessing the DAMT norm
by asking third parties whether one’s spouse is faithful—searching web browser history or credit
card bills, secretly pursuing emails and text messages on a partner’s smart phone, and so on—
easily could be unstable, an artifact of an era where technology for detecting snooping have not
caught up with snooping tools in the mass consumer marketplace. 242 On the other hand, when A
asks C instead of B, A at least avoids the risk of personal insult and trust-defying accusation,
while sometimes relieving C of a felt inhibition about bearing bad news.
This last point indicates a payoff for the nuances surrounding use norms. Regardless of
how the considerations net out for suspected infidelity and other situations, the rapid expansion
of ask-C opportunities is an occasion to stop and think hard: Exactly why do and should we have
any given combination of asking and telling norms? Use norms plainly cannot explain
everything. But knowing whether use norms are important allows us to make progress in
evaluating contemporary asking-and-telling norms. The contemporary academic literature on
disclosure seems focused on the benefits from proper use of disclosed information and the
likelihood of nonuse or misuse, although scholars worry about the costs of disclosure as well. 243
Use considerations do matter often, but they provide little help in comprehending some
combinations of asking and telling rules. One also needs to consider power dynamics,
expectations in trust relationships, subtle forms of discrimination, agency problems, and the
pathologies of factional warfare. Understanding the relationship between asking and telling is
more complicated than understanding telling in isolation.
B. Beyond Q&A
We are writing at an odd moment. In 2015, the United States and, to a lesser degree,
other industrialized countries seem to be embracing Big Data—the combination of gigantic data
sets with analytics designed to reveal patterns that might predict future behavior. Feeding the
developing algorithms is a stream of information supplied via voluntary web postings,
commercial transactions, and high-tech surveillance in public places and work spaces that was
unimaginable a generation ago. 244 The United States is in the midst of a “Reputation
Revolution,” where it is becoming easier for firms, governments, and ordinary people to learn a
great many facts about any citizen without ever asking that person a direct question. 245 As a
result, maybe the traditional form of asking and telling is becoming passé. What are the
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implications for social norms and legal regimes when A can ask C (or watch B instead of asking
B) and get the same or better information more easily than ever before?
Suppose two potential student roommates, Alan and Bob, are trying to assess each other’s
compatibility. It is likely that they will have a conversation with one another, in person or
virtually. But it is equally likely that they will Google each other, examine each other’s
Facebook pages and Twitter feeds, interrogate mutual acquaintances, and generally obtain more
information from third parties than they will acquire directly from each other. Things would have
been different a decade ago, and maybe they will be different a decade from now. But for the
time being, this reliance on third parties is widespread and significant. To some degree, reliance
on third parties may render social norms or laws that limit asking or telling obsolete. Observers
are sometimes in the habit of concluding that new technology tends to make a regulation
ineffective, perhaps especially when the traditional rules were legally questionable anyway.
An automatic shift to “May Ask C, C May Tell” would be too quick, however. Even if
the old rules for A and B will no longer inhibit information flows, the old reasons for those rules
might still apply. Alan’s asking Bob’s friends about Bob’s sexuality, academic aptitude, or
neatness may be no less gauche than Alan asking Bob these questions directly. And while formal
law likely has little effect on the sorts of disclosures that Bob’s friends would make to Alan,
social norms might fill the gap. Moreover, relevant provisions like the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 246 privacy tort law, 247 or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 248 will substantially
affect which facts about Bob Apple, Verizon, or Bank of America is willing to share with Alan.
If the old norms that regulated Q&A between Alan and Bob were based on use concerns, those
concerns easily can carry forward to ask C situations, albeit with updated and imperfect
regulatory tools. On the other hand, if the old norms were only based on, say, protecting people
like Bob from getting their feelings hurt when they face direct questions about hygiene—and
protecting people like Alan from inadvertently insulting others—then there might be no reason
for controlling ask-C efforts, whether high or low tech.
A very different response to ask C opportunities is to move toward use rules. Society
might let information flow freely but constrain Alan’s ability to use it. As Scott Peppet explains,
these “Don’t Use” rules arise in a number of contexts. To borrow one example he provides, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) was enacted by Congress in 2008 to prevent
the use of genetic information by insurers. 249 Preventing an orchestra from determining the
gender of someone auditioning to join it and preventing the orchestra from making the
performer’s gender relevant to its decision about which musician to select are alternative
mechanisms to achieve the same ends. Which mechanism is better depends on various factors,
but where the commitment to stamp out a vice (like gender discrimination in classical music) is
strong enough, it may be prudent to combine both strategies. 250 As we saw above, 251 civil
discovery rules similarly work together to govern both the circumstances under which
information should be exchanged (privileged or work product) and the appropriate uses when a
246
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privileged document is accidentally disclosed (admissible or inadmissible). The connection
between legal restrictions on obtaining information and restrictions on using the information
obtained was noted long ago. 252
Of course, the trade-offs between Q&A norms and use norms are changing. Many people
take for granted that determining whether a decision maker has accessed information is usually
easier than determining whether she has used that information to make a decision. Access and
receipt often can be proven objectively, but decisionmaking may be opaque enough to leave an
external observer relying on the decision maker’s statements about what was in her head plus the
observer’s own hunches about the decision maker’s credibility. These generalizations now
deserve challenge, however. As more economic activity moves online and finds its way into
datasets, the same Big Databases that are used to identify behavioral patterns and generate
predictions can also be used to track anomalies in hiring, termination, promotion, evaluations,
and the like. The secretly racist boss or police officer can be revealed—algorithmically—
provided the system knows the races of those subject to his discretion and can compare him with
unbiased decision makers who interact with similar populations. 253 For most of our history, the
collection of information has been more transparent than its use. This made restricting collection
the most practical route available for legal or social reformers concerned with privacy, power, or
other interests. But as collection (via third parties or surveillance) has become less transparent,
use has become more so, at least in some contexts. This dynamic, combined with American
exceptionalism where free speech is concerned, suggests that use restrictions will take on
increased importance to support old commitments under new circumstances.
There will even be instances in which people will value nondisclosure so much that even
seemingly airtight combinations of “DADTDU” 254 will be deemed inadequate. This situation
describes the law in at least fourteen states with respect to trade secrets. 255 In its famous 1995
opinion in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, the Seventh Circuit considered claims against William
Redmond, a former Pepsi manager. He had defected to the Quaker Oats Company (which owned
Gatorade, Snapple, and other beverages) while he still possessed trade secret knowledge about
PepsiCo’s pricing and marketing plans. 256 Embracing the doctrine of “inevitable disclosure,” the
court held that Redmond should be enjoined from working for Quaker until the inside knowledge
he had about Pepsi’s pricing and marketing strategies for the coming year became stale. 257 The
injunction would survive notwithstanding Redmond’s agreeing to disclose none of Pepsi’s
secrets to Quaker and Quaker’s promises not to use any of Redmond’s confidential
information. 258 As the court put it, “PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one of whose
252
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players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big game.” 259 The court
said it was inevitable that Redmond would use Pepsi’s confidential information in his capacity as
a manager for a company in direct competition with Pepsi, and in light of this inevitability the
only solution was to prevent him from working there. 260
It is initially hard to imagine other instances in which confidentiality is treated as
sufficiently important to justify not only restrictions on asking, restrictions on telling, and
restrictions on using, but also restrictions on the establishment of relationships themselves. Yet
the trade secrets example is not unique. Law firms routinely are required to turn away lucrative
work because of conflicts of interest that could arise with respect to the firm’s existing clients. A
well-enforced DADT rule presumably would build in sufficient precautions to prevent
inappropriate knowledge spillovers from affecting the work that lawyers do. But law instead
prohibits the work from flowing to the conflicted firm in the absence of the affected party’s
consent. 261 Or take security clearances. For people with high-level clearances, telling is
forbidden, as are uses outside of one’s capacity as a government employee. For those deemed
non-trustworthy, a variant of PepsiCo is implemented: applicants will not be permitted to work
for the agency at all if their trustworthiness cannot be established ex ante. 262
Finally, there are similar implications for “Must Ask” norms. Increasing opportunities for
ask-C solutions can increase the plausibility of duties to gather information from third parties,
when a must-ask or must-tell norm is based on a desire to ensure that the information is used in
decision-making. Direct Q&A is often encumbered by reliability problems associated with selfreporting in any event. Querying third parties and databases sometimes is a more reliable
information-gathering strategy, and it is becoming faster and cheaper every year. Consider what
the IRS does when a known income earner fails to file a tax return. The agency does not always
give up. Drawing on information already gathered in federal government data banks, the IRS
may effectively fill out a tax return for the non-filer and then pursue collection remedies. 263 We
can imagine a similar practice of investigation becoming a social or legal duty of employers and
sellers in restricted markets, or maybe the duty of their government regulators, where the politics
are conducive and where efficient screening can be done by accessing databases. State law
causes of action for negligent hiring already create such duties in some jurisdictions. 264 As with
259
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don’t-ask norms, however, must-ask and must-tell norms are not always built on commitments
regarding the use of information. So, again, perhaps no change in practices will be warranted if
the reason for mandating questions is, for instance, to convey respect for another person’s
judgment without demanding that it be exercised in a particular direction.
C. Reform
The norms we introduce in this Article are sticky, but they can change over time.
Christian wedding officiants no longer crowdsource the question of whether nuptials should
proceed, as we noted above. 265 The new norm is DAMT, at least where there is a close enough
relationship between the party possessing explosive information and either member of the
couple. This shift makes sense, given the infrequency with which anyone attending a wedding
accepted the officiant’s invitation to speak against the union’s wisdom. Shifting the conversation
initiation duty to the party with the information likely has the further effect of promoting early
disclosure, so that a doomed wedding could be called off, ideally before the wedding invitations
are sent, thereby keeping a lid on the gossip-worthy turn of events and saving nuptial-related
expenditures. The increased availability of ask-C options might also have empowered brides and
grooms to do due diligence on each other, thereby reducing the probability that skeletons will be
hiding in the closets of his or her intended. 266 On balance, the norms appear to have changed for
the better.
The law of Q&A changes, too, in major and minor ways. Over a number of years our
criminal trial system shifted hard from “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which prohibited criminal
defendants from testifying, to “May Ask, May Tell,” which left the matter to the defendant’s
option. 267 Our first extreme example in this Article—the U.S. military’s limited DADT policy—
also crumbled as use norms shifted and turned into something like “Don’t Ask, May Tell.”
Don’t-tell rules for gays in the military have gone the way of must-tell rules governing
Communist Party membership, 268 largely in response to changing popular attitudes about
morality and the seriousness of perceived threats to social stability. In a pro-regulatory direction,
consider the developing restrictions on employer questions to support anti-discrimination goals.
And, to add a recent illustration, consider Transportation Security Administration (TSA) airport
screening. TSA used to require that every boarding passenger be asked whether “anyone
unknown to you has asked you to carry an item onto this flight” and whether “any of the items
you are traveling with [have] been out of your immediate control since the time you packed
them.” 269 The questions were implemented after the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and two near
misses where terrorists had apparently deceived their girlfriends into carrying explosives hidden
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in their suitcases onto planes. 270 The questions were eliminated in 2002, after inefficiency
complaints built up and evidence of terrorism prevention failed to materialize. 271 Air travelers no
longer get reminders of such residual risks via repetitious questioning, 272 but TSA insisted that it
would continue to raise awareness through automated announcements in airports. 273 It does not
appear that airline employees ever exercise discretion to ask such questions today. Perhaps the
concern is that letting employees ask the question of some customers would reveal an unsavory
form of racial profiling, such that asking everyone and asking no one are the most palatable
possibilities.274
Our framework for analyzing Q&A norms should be illuminating in several ways, one of
them being intelligent and critical evaluation of existing policy well beyond a TSA choice to
announce instead of ask. Before concluding, we will sketch a few other instances in which
reasonable people may conclude that society could do better by altering particular asking and
telling rules.
One straightforward suggestion involves employment discrimination law. We have seen
that the don’t-use norms in antidiscrimination laws are not always backed up by legal restrictions
on asking, let alone telling. 275 Although our sense is that there is relatively little unraveling in
employment markets with respect to issues like planned pregnancies that may require a job
applicant to take parental leave, the behavior may be sufficiently troubling to warrant a DADT
legal rule. Particularly in small companies with generous parental leave policies, extended leaves
can impose real short-term costs on a firm and on co-workers. If a job seeker credibly articulates
a lack of interest in becoming a parent any time soon, a boss may have a hard time giving this
information no weight, even though giving it any weight would constitute unlawful
discrimination. 276 For the same reason that some orchestras have musicians audition behind
screens that prevent those evaluating the music from learning the performer’s race, gender, or
age, a firm might demonstrate its commitment to gender equality in hiring by prohibiting
applicants from saying anything about their parenting plans. Law can reinforce such
commitments, and it can help deter employers from exploiting burgeoning ask-C options. Such
extensions of law would follow ongoing concern about certain topics being foregrounded in the
employment context, importantly motivated by don’t-use norms.
A very different recommendation would liberalize Q&A in the workplace and rely more
heavily on don’t-use norms. As we mentioned above, employer ability to work around don’t ask
norms is increasing along with observers’ ability to identify possible instances of discriminatory
decisions. Big Data and pervasive surveillance can be and is directed at many targets, some of
270
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them relatively powerful. If the enforcement of don’t-use norms in employment becomes reliable
enough, then important good can be accomplished by opening up lines of questions and
responses on heretofore legally sensitive subjects. Regulating Q&A certainly can be useful, but,
as we observed at the outset, that strategy entails information losses. Questions can be the
simplest way to avoid mutual misunderstanding about each other’s abilities, values, and other
traits, without depending on guesswork or third-party estimations. Co-workers might be more
satisfied with their jobs when they feel free to discuss a variety of topics at the water cooler, and
they might better understand how to adjust standard operating procedures so that the firm
flourishes economically. This openness might be an unintended side effect of some courts
tinkering with a must-ask norm in ADA cases, 277 contrary to the suggestion in Abercrombie that
such questions are off limits until the employee raises the issue. 278 An employer might have a
duty to ask if the employer suspects that an employee might benefit from an accommodation. A
clear legal duty would dampen litigation risk from initiating productive conversations, as well as
any bad signal that an employee might see in discretionary questioning about disability or
religion. Compelled questions can have these effects.
Next, recall our discussion of the prevalence of MADT in civil discovery and its decision
to impose few duties on the party seeking discovery to reduce the probability that privileged
information will be erroneously produced. 279 At a macro-level, the American legal system’s
comfort with an unusual MADT regime in this setting reflects the generally adversarial character
of the litigation system that we have built, tempered by modest efforts to preserve a degree of
gentility and efficiency. Given what we wrote earlier about high-stakes discovery, the following
subversive question now seems natural: Does litigation have to be that way? Can we imagine a
system closer to trust-based DAMT than adversarial MADT? After all, the design of our
litigation system has never been set in stone and always has been a mixture of adversarial,
inquisitorial, managerial, and other models. 280 Consider one alternative. At the outset of
litigation, the lawyer for party A would stand up and say, “Here are the strong points of our case
and here are all the reasons why my own client’s case is weak and the other side should win.”
The lawyer for party B would then stand up and do likewise. Having heard a candid assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case, the lawyers could then presumably hammer
out a settlement reflecting the relative positions of each party. If the rules are effective, asking
becomes a pointless waste of client money. Perfect telling obviates the need to ask. It sounds
dreamy, 281 but there is an obvious problem of incentives. Lawyers will be rewarded when their
clients achieve good results, and if there is no one auditing the veracity of a lawyer’s confessions
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about his client’s strengths and weaknesses, then there will be an overwhelming temptation to
shade the truth in a manner that makes the client’s case look stronger than it is.
And yet in the highly adversarial context of criminal discovery, the Brady doctrine
requires prosecutors to hand over exculpatory or impeachment evidence to defense counsel. 282
The failure to do so may result in an acquittal. What seems unrealistic on the civil side is
constitutionally compulsory on one side of the criminal context, where the prosecutor has
immense power over the accused as well as public responsibilities. 283 The duty to avoid asking
questions that unduly risk prompting mistaken disclosures by the other side in civil litigation
might be less radical than the government’s must-tell duty to disclose information adverse to its
prospects for conviction. Consider then the following modest reform: Litigation in which the
government is seeking substantial civil penalties against firms or individuals should be structured
so that the state has Brady-style must tell obligations. 284 More ambitiously, we can imagine a
sufficiently robust auditing mechanism that could make DAMT work for all civil discovery.
Suppose that in one of every twenty cases, an inspector general assessed the veracity of a
lawyer’s representations about his client’s case. This auditor would be entitled to see everything
that the lawyer saw and to second guess every characterization. Penalties for shading the truth
could be as severe as necessary. Conceivably this would be an improvement over the status quo,
although the proposal admittedly is not clearly compatible with the interests of those invested in
the existing system.
To canvass another domain for possible reform, one might worry that while the Freedom
of Information Act does an adequate job of ensuring the transparency of shallow government
secrets, the program breaks down when it comes to deep secrets—the unknown unknowns of
state conduct. 285 For this reason, commentators have proposed second-order disclosure
requirements, whereby the executive must disclose information to Congress or the public in
282
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order to ensure that critical programs’ existence is not kept secret from people who have
oversight responsibilities but lack the creativity to anticipate that such programs have been
implemented. 286 The effect of these executive disclosure requirements, which have been
implemented in a few domains, 287 is to help ensure that the government’s telling is not made
contingent on anyone’s asking.
Finally, in exploring reform options, the universe is not limited to policies that already
combine asking and telling regulations. Rather, readers might identify any information flow
problem that concerns them and then ask how different combinations of asking and telling rules
might address it. There are countless such problems in society, but let us use gender pay
disparities for illustration. One significant contributor to the problem of pay disparity is that men
are more likely than women to initiate negotiations regarding raises. 288 Valuable recent
scholarship proposes using disclosure strategies to counteract the pay gap. 289 But some research
suggests that men generally ask to make more than their peers are making and women
systematically ask to make the same salary as peers. 290 Disclosure will not counteract that
dynamic; other mechanisms could. Perhaps pursuant to a consent decree, a firm found liable for
pay discrimination might implement a gender-sensitive regime of existing salary transparency:
DAMT for female employees and DADT for male workers. Thus, during annual performance
reviews women (but not men) would hear what their peers are earning, and all parties would be
prohibited from asking about salary information to ameliorate the disparities that stem from
men’s disproportionate tendency to solicit salary information as a precursor to salary
negotiations. The evidence suggests that, once armed with information about peer salaries,
women would seek pay that brings them closely into line with what male peers are earning. 291
Such a regime might achieve the same egalitarian results as an alternative remedy, such as
ongoing judicial monitoring of male and female salaries, at a much lower cost, given the
difficulty courts and other outside monitors have in determining whether any particular
employees of a firm deserve the same pay.
Readers may disagree that these reforms would be desirable, which is fine. Our goal here
is not to promote any particular set of changes. Rather, by highlighting the relationship between
asking and telling, we want to encourage readers to identify their own examples of policies and
norms that are currently situated in questionable boxes. Structured thinking about asking and
telling in conjunction can open up a host of controversial and interesting possibilities.
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CONCLUSION
There has been virtually no legal scholarship on the dynamic relationship between asking
and telling rules, which are two building blocks for human relationships. We are interested in
moving beyond monologues. We want to understand conversations involving asking and telling,
and the various constraints that legal and social systems place on them. A skeptic might wonder
whether combining the study of asking and telling rules yields insights that looking at them in
isolation would not. This Article shows that the answer is yes. Questions are a special device for
information collection embedded within an interactive social practice involving the exchange of
information. Lawyers of all people should understand that the process of information revelation
is no less important than the consequences of information revelation. Regulating the process of
asking and telling influences the substantive outcomes of conversations. Perhaps more
surprisingly, such regulation can change the preferences and relationships of the conversation
participants. Moreover, regulation of Q&A may be driven by goals apart from the proper use of
information. So getting the disclosure rules exactly right, which is not really possible, is only part
of the challenge. In any event, if we look only at the regulation of telling or the regulation of
asking, we will walk away with an insufficiently rich understanding of what makes our legal and
social systems tick.
In investigating a large array of domains for asking and telling, we have stressed that
sound evaluation must account for both social norms and legal rules. When put together, we can
make sense of some extraordinary combinations of asking and telling rules—and we can more
precisely criticize some other combinations. But because asking and telling rules are only
sometimes related to use rules, even this much is not enough. And because opportunities for
people to work around existing asking and telling rules are rapidly expanding with new
technology and analytics, we will have to rethink some old rules. Getting a good picture of these
moving parts is a difficult task, but an exciting one, too. We are encouraged that the answers to
the questions we pose are multi-faceted. The world is a complicated place, probably more so as
technology and rules shift. Mono-causal explanations and uni-dimensional justifications for
broad social phenomena rarely withstand scrutiny. In this initial effort, we have attempted to
identify major questions that other scholars will feel inspired—or even compelled—to answer.
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